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communities. We show that police target parolee-dense neighborhoods for
additional Terry stops, even when income, race, population, and singlefamily status are accounted for. Furthermore, police take advantage of the
permissive parole search jurisprudence, conducting more searches and
arrests of both parolees and their nonparolee neighbors. Combined, this
analysis shows that parole institutionalizes individuals and marginalizes
communities.
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INTRODUCTION
Prisoner parole1 is widely considered to be a defendant-friendly
institution2 for obvious reasons—it is designed to reduce the sentences that
individuals serve in prison and to aid prisoner reintegration.3 However, a
detailed analysis of how parole actually operates raises serious doubts
about whether it really works in the interests of the incarcerated. In this
Article, we show that there are a number of institutional mechanisms by
which parole significantly undermines the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
1. Unless otherwise noted, this Article uses the terms “parole” and “community supervision” to
refer to post-release community supervision after incarceration. See, e.g., Joan Petersilia, Parole and
Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIME & JUST. 479, 482 (1999) (noting that jurisdictions use
different terms to refer to this period of supervision).
2. See Position Statement, AM. PROBATION & PAROLE ASS’N (Jan. 1987), http://www.appanet.org/eweb/Dynamicpage.aspx?webcode=IB_PositionStatement (describing the parole system as one
designed to assist parolees); AMY L. SOLOMON ET AL., URBAN INST., DOES PAROLE WORK? (2005),
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311156_ Does_Parole_Work.pdf (providing a more
nuanced view of parole).
3. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972) (noting that parole was meant “to help
individuals reintegrate into society as constructive individuals as soon as they are able, without being
confined for the full term of the sentence imposed” and that it “also serve[d] to alleviate the costs to
society of keeping an individual in prison”). See also Joel M. Caplan, Parole System Anomie:
Conflicting Models of Casework and Surveillance, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 2006, at 32, 32–33 (2006)
(describing the history of and policies supporting parole).
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Amendment rights of parolees, as well as the Fourth Amendment rights of
their communities. We conduct a detailed doctrinal and empirical analysis
showing that the extensive conditions imposed on parolees, combined with
other permissive search and seizure jurisprudence and police targeting of
parolee-dense neighborhoods for nonrandomized stops, have resulted in
significant yet unappreciated attrition of constitutional rights.
For parolees, the standard for reincarceration on suspicion of a parole
violation is very low. Like other arrests, the federal standard for arrest for a
parole violation is probable cause;4 but unlike other arrestees, parolees can
be held for up to three months awaiting a violation hearing. In addition, the
standard at that hearing is not proof beyond reasonable doubt, but rather a
preponderance of the evidence.5 These low bars for extended incarceration
of parolees awaiting a hearing create numerous points of vulnerability in
constitutional rights.
First, the possibility of being incarcerated for three months for minor
or technical violations of parole provides a powerful means of leverage
over parolees. Police use this leverage to recruit parolees as confidential
informants, a role that places parolees in danger but nonetheless serves an
important community policing function. However, it also makes the parolee
subject to less altruistic forms of influence. Local criminals and gangs who
know the parole status of individuals can use the threat of reporting a
violation of the terms of release—real or trumped up—as a basis for
coercion. As such, although parole is meant to keep parolees on the path
toward reintegration into the community, it actually provides a means of
blackmailing parolees into criminality and recidivism.
Second, whatever the basis for arrest for an alleged parole violation,
the rehabilitation and reintegration goals that the parole system was
intended to promote are undermined by the length of incarceration that
parolees face while awaiting their violation hearings. Even if exonerated,
three months of incarceration is likely to cause parolees to lose their jobs,
their welfare benefits, their access to schooling and housing, and even
potentially their stabilizing relationships—the very elements that are the
4. A supervised parolee “may be arrested” “[i]f there is probable cause to believe” he or she
“has violated a condition of his . . . release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3606 (2012).
5. Id. § 3583(e)(3) (providing that a court may modify or revoke supervised release if it “finds
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release”). See
also United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting § 3583(e)(3) for the
conclusion that a district court must find a violation of supervised release by a “preponderance of the
evidence”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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best predictors of successful reintegration.6 Recidivism is often considered
a consequence of the individual’s propensity to commit more crimes. But
by creating a perverse system whereby minor infractions of parole lead to
potentially disproportionate punishments, the regulatory system and
jurisprudence of parole ultimately extend individuals’ institutionalization
and undermine their rehabilitation.
Third, the Sixth Amendment rules pertaining to parole are extremely
restrictive of parolees’ rights. As mentioned, conviction for a release
violation requires only a preponderance of the evidence. So if a parolee is
accused of a crime while on parole, he or she can be acquitted of that crime
yet nonetheless be reincarcerated for that very offense under the lower
standard of a parole violation. Furthermore, even if the parolee is only
accused of a technical violation—for instance, failing to attend meetings
with a parole supervisor—he or she can be subject to a longer term of
incarceration than he was initially sentenced to serve. Not only that, but the
parole violation can extend his or her sentence beyond the maximum
sentence allowed for the initial crime.7 These Sixth Amendment issues
have been considered by the courts, and although we show logical
inconsistencies in that jurisprudence, the point is not to reargue their
merits; rather, when considered in combination with the other ramifications
of parole described here, it becomes apparent that the overall effect of
parole on prisoners can be to elongate rather than shorten sentences and
also to further contribute to the institutionalized cycle of imprisonment.
An institutionalized culture of incarceration has been well documented
as extending beyond the individual to particular subgroups of the
community, particularly racial minorities.8 What has not been appreciated,
however, is the role that parole plays in that process of institutionalizing the
culture of incarceration. This effect is not simply indirect, trickling down
from the individual to the community by virtue of the sheer number of
individuals incarcerated in particular regions or cultures; rather, the rights
of individuals who live with or near parolees are directly undermined by
the parole system and its jurisprudence.
Most significantly, if you live with a parolee or if the police suspect
that you live with a parolee, your constitutional rights can be directly and
6. See infra notes 234–35.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in
African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004) (analyzing the destructive impact of
incarceration at the community level rather than the individual level).
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adversely affected by rulings that parolees can be subjected to manifold
stringent restrictions.9 In Samson v. California, the Supreme Court
permitted parole conditions so strict that they “diminish or eliminate” any
reasonable expectation of privacy.10 Thus, Samson allows police to conduct
searches of parolees and their homes without a warrant or even reasonable
suspicion.11 Not only are individual parolees subject to arbitrary searches
and essentially forced to waive their own Fourth Amendment rights,12 but
to a large extent parole also has similar effects for those with whom they
live.13 The ramifications of this situation are far more profound for
particular communities—consider that “[o]ne in three young African
American men will serve time in prison if the current trends continue, and
in some cities more than half of all young adult black men are currently
under correctional control—in prison or jail, on probation or parole.”14
Conceivably, then, there are entire neighborhoods in which Fourth
Amendment rights have little meaning. The community effect, then, is not
simply an aggregate of the effect on individuals, but rather it further
exacerbates the impact of parole on rights attrition.
Parole jurisprudence raises the risk of serious attrition of community
rights. To determine whether this possibility is in fact a reality, we conduct
an empirical assessment of the extent to which different communities are
facing diminution of their Fourth Amendment rights. We created two new
databases that combine New York City parolee residence data with Terry
stop15 data as well as frisk, search, and arrest data. We establish two
9. Moore v. Vega, 371 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2004); Thornton v. Lund, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1053,
1057 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (citing Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2005)) (“[I]f officials
reasonably believe that a parolee or probationer lives at a particular house, courts analyze the search as
if the parolee or probationer in fact lived there.”).
10. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847 (2006).
11. Id. See also Thornton, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 1057 (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.
112, 121 (2001); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875–76 (1987)) (“The Fourth Amendment
provides lesser protection to parolees and probationers; such individuals may not complain of a
warrantless search of their residence.”).
12. United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 691–92 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the defendant’s
decision to make a blanket waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights was valid, since “imprisonment is a
greater invasion of personal privacy than being exposed to searches of one’s home on demand”).
13. See infra Part II.A.2.
14. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 9 (2010). Alexander’s data is based on THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974–2001 (2003), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf.
15. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), created an exception to the ordinary rule that individuals
cannot be seized without probable cause and a warrant. Under Terry stops, police need only reasonable
articulable suspicion to temporarily seize a person; furthermore, police can frisk—pat down the outside
of the clothes of—an individual if they have reasonable suspicion that the subject possesses a weapon.
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important effects showing that police target parolee-dense communities for
nonrandomized stops and further intrusions.
First, we demonstrate that there is a strong relationship between rates
of parolee residence and police Terry stops in New York City. Obviously
this does not prove causation: we expect there to be more Terry stops in
high-crime neighborhoods, and also more parolee residents in high-crime
neighborhoods. However, our regression analysis shows that this finding is
robust even after controlling for factors such as race, income, and density
of single-parent families. These ordinary predictors of crime do not fully
explain police targeting of individuals for Terry stops: the density of
parolees in a neighborhood is significant beyond mere crime targeting by
police.
The effect in fact overwhelms the race of the neighborhood—when
parolee status is factored in, race no longer predicts the occurrence of Terry
stops in New York City. This has great significance for the highly salient
litigation that the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) recently
settled, with an agreement for ongoing judicial oversight.16 The high
correlation also shows the potential impact of the jurisprudential rules
described above: entire neighborhoods with little to no constitutional
criminal rights. Our results suggest that parole is likely to exacerbate the
already troubled relationship that exists between the police and targeted
minorities.
Second, we show that not only do police stop more individuals in high
parolee density neighborhoods, but that they then conduct significantly
more searches and arrests in those neighborhoods. The rate of frisks,
however, are lower in parolee-dense neighborhoods, suggesting that police
are not simply targeting high-crime or high-convict neighborhoods: only
searches of parolees require lower suspicion thresholds, enabling police to
skip frisks and go straight to searches without probable cause. The numbers
Any evidence gathered can then be used to establish probable cause for a search or arrest.
16. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), is a federal class action
lawsuit filed against the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) and the City of New York that
found that the NYPD practice of nonrandom stop and frisks constituted unconstitutional racial
discrimination. On November 11, 2013, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals granted the
city’s motion to stay the district court’s remedial decision. Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F. 3d 118
(2d Cir. 2013). However, on November 24, 2013, the Court of Appeals issued an order holding this, and
all other pending motions, in abeyance. Id. Floyd is one of three simultaneous lawsuits challenging the
constitutionality of the NYPD stop and frisk program. The others are Ligon v. City of New York, 925
F.Supp. 2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (challenging stops, ticket issuance and arrests of individuals in private
apartment buildings) and Raza v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-3448, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166820
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2013) (alleging religious profiling in NYPD stops of Muslim New Yorkers).
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are so significant that it is unlikely that only parolees are being targeted.
Entire communities where parolees commonly reside are subject to
different policing strategies. These results indicate that police have been
utilizing the permissive search jurisprudence we critique to nonrandomly
target some neighborhoods for greater intrusions. Samson and its ilk are
having meaningful adverse effects on the broader communities in which
parolees reside.
The first step to solving these problems is to recognize their existence
and to question whether parole is really a positive mechanism of
reintegrating convicts back into the community. Finding a solution also
requires re-examining the jurisprudence surrounding parole, given these
largely unintended consequences, and in light of our empirical findings of
nonrandomized policing practices extending beyond race—parole is
another geographic mechanism for the infectious degradation of
community rights.
Throughout this Article, we analyze both the federal parole system,
called supervised release, and the parole system in New York State as
illustrations. New York rules on Terry stops are actually less intrusive than
the Supreme Court allows.17 Nevertheless, we show that in application,
New York parolees and their communities are still vulnerable targets for
police profiling. This is because even when jurisdictions only utilize some
of the permissive Terry stop rules, in combination with other lowered rights
created by the parole jurisprudence, parolees effectively have no real
protection against police targeting. In effect, some lowered rights breed
further lowered rights, for both the individual and the community. We first
show this in terms of broad doctrinal theory, then in application.
Part I provides a brief background of parole, including the rules of
operation and rates of revocation. It then describes the terms in which we
assess the merits of the current parole system as crime enforcement and
convict reintegration policy.
Part II provides an in-depth doctrinal analysis, exploring the adverse
impact on parolees’ constitutional rights. It first shows how Samson
combines with Georgia v. Randolph18 to diminish the constitutional rights
of both parolees and the nonparolee communities in which parolees live.
Not only is the individual institutionalized by the parole system, but also
the constitutional rights of communities are systematically diminished. It
17. See infra note 254 (showing that the rules in New York are somewhat more generous but
otherwise similar to numerous other states).
18. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
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then establishes how parole can actually extend rather than shorten
parolees’ sentences, even beyond the legislative maximums, and analyzes
the Sixth Amendment implications of this policy. This part then describes
the attrition of other procedural rights by the parole system, including
(1) the state’s lowered burden in parole revocation hearings, (2) evidentiary
issues, and (3) other Fourth and Fifth Amendment ramifications.
Part III considers the practical effects of the parole system. It
illustrates that the jurisprudence that permits extremely stringent parole
conditions results in the vulnerability of individual parolees, decreasing
their rights as against the police and increasing their manipulability by
criminal elements. It then describes in detail the lowered burden on the
police for stops and searches of parolees in New York City.
Part IV tests whether police target parolees in Terry stops, frisks,
searches and arrests in New York City, and whether that affects not only
parolees but also the community more broadly. We show that individual
and community rights are being adversely affected in systematic ways by a
parole jurisprudence of restrictive conditions and aggressive police
searches, resulting in increased police stops, searches and arrests.
Part IV tests only one aspect of the attrition of individual and
community rights enabled by an overly punitive parole system. Parts I-III
provide the doctrinal framework to show why police will have incentives to
target parolees in Terry stops and explore the broader impact of the parole
system on the attrition of individual and community rights. Together, the
legal and empirical analyses show that the overall parole framework
undermines the reintegrative aims of the parole system.
I. BACKGROUND: PAROLE AND SUPERVISED RELEASE
In this part, we briefly provide the most important background
information on the parole system, including: an introduction to the central
rules and operation of the parole system in federal and state jurisdictions;
conditions of parole and bases of revocation; and rates of revocation and
recidivism. We then describe how we assess the parole system, and how we
can conclude that parole is diminishing constitutional rights overall.
A. PAROLE IN GENERAL
In the federal system, community supervision—referred to as
supervised release—is imposed by the court at sentencing and is mandatory
when the individual is sentenced to a period of incarceration of one year or
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more.19 In addition, a court may also use its discretion to order supervised
release whenever it imprisons an offender.20 In these discretionary cases,
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines give courts detailed guidance about
whether to impose a term of supervised release and what conditions to
include. The court must consider certain statutory factors, including “the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant,” the need to deter crime, and the need to provide
restitution.21 It should focus particular attention on the seriousness of the
offender’s criminal history.22 A court should consider the same factors in
determining whether to impose supervised release and the length of that
release.23 Section 3583(b) of Title 18 of the United States Code describes
the maximum periods of supervised release for different levels of offense.24
Importantly, the term of supervised release is in addition to a term of
imprisonment and “does not replace” any “portion of” this term.25 This fact
belies the common first response to criticism of the parole system from the
perspective of the individual convict: that although parole conditions may
be extremely stringent, presumably parole is preferable to remaining in
prison, since parole amounts to at least partial freedom for a length of time
that would otherwise be spent in incarceration. We return to this topic in
Part II.B.
Throughout this Article, to illustrate the operation of parole in the
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (2012) (providing that a court “may include as a part of the sentence a
requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment”); U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.1(a)(2) (2013) (requiring supervised release when “a
sentence of imprisonment of more than one year is imposed”). A term of community supervision is also
mandatory if the statute governing the crime requires it or if the offender is convicted of domestic
violence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a). And if the offender “is an abuser” of drugs or alcohol, “it is highly
recommended” that the court include a term of supervised release. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5D1.1 cmt. n.3(C).
20. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.1(b).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c). These are a “subset” of the factors a court must consider in determining
how to punish someone convicted of a crime. See also id. § 3553(a) (“Factors to Be Considered in
Imposing a Sentence”); United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195, 203 (6th Cir. 2011) (discussing the use
of these factors).
22. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.1 cmt. n.3(B).
23. Id. § 5D1.2 cmt. n.4 (“The court should ensure that the term imposed on the defendant is
long enough to address the purposes of imposing supervised release on the defendant.”).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) (providing, for example, maximum periods of release of five years for
Class A or B felonies and three years for Class C or D felonies). The Sentencing Guidelines require
minimal terms of release for these levels of offense. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5D1.2(a).
25. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A2(b) (“Unlike parole, a term of supervised
release does not replace a portion of the sentence of imprisonment, but rather is an order of supervision
in addition to any term of imprisonment imposed by the court.”).
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states, we examine New York code and practices. New York law, like
federal law, provides for the release of offenders to parole.26 The length of
parole supervision depends upon the class of the felony and the offender’s
criminal history,27 and is negotiable as long as it falls within the guideline
range.28 Depending on the crime of conviction, even community
supervision for the remainder of an offender’s life is acceptable.29 Since the
period of supervision is considered part of the sentence, defendants must be
informed of it as part of the sentencing judgment,30 and knowledge of
supervision is required for a guilty plea to be considered knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent.31
B. CONDITIONS OF COMMUNITY SUPERVISION
The conditions of community supervision are fairly standard across
jurisdictions. They typically include reporting requirements, curfews,
prohibitions on the use of drugs or alcohol, and restrictions on travel,
residency, and associating with certain individuals or groups. In the federal
system, courts must impose as a condition of release that the offender shall
not commit another crime or possess illegal drugs, and the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines recommend more than a dozen “standard” conditions.32 For
example, “the defendant shall not leave the judicial district . . . without the
permission of the court or probation officer” and “the defendant shall
support the defendant’s dependents.”33 Another standard requirement that
we will explore the ramifications of in Part II.A specifies that “the
defendant shall permit a probation officer to visit the defendant at any time
at home or elsewhere.”34 This provision offers just one of the ways in
26. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.40 (McKinney 2009). Post-release supervision is mandatory for a
number of felony offenses, including violent felonies, drug offenses, and sex offenses. Id. § 70.45.
27. Id. § 70.45; Spiros A. Tsimbinos & John M. Castellano, Practice Insights: Negotiating
Period of Post-Release Supervision as Part of Determinate Term, in N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.45 (Consol.
Supp. Feb. 2014).
28. Tsimbinos & Castellano, supra note 27 (“Counsel may negotiate the period of supervision
within the permissible ranges as part of any plea and sentence discussion.”).
29. People v. Zammett, 849 N.Y.S.2d 686, 687 (App. Div. 2008) (holding that imposing
community supervision for the remainder of an offender’s life for a criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the third degree conviction was not too severe).
30. People v. Catu, 825 N.E.2d 1081, 1082 (N.Y. 2005) (holding that failure to inform defendant
of community supervision must result in withdrawal of plea without a harmless error analysis). See also
People v. Sparber, 889 N.E.2d 459, 464 (N.Y. 2008) (holding that a court’s failure to announce the
required period of supervision at the time of sentencing makes the sentence unenforceable).
31. Catu, 825 N.E.2d at 1082.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3(a), (c) (2013).
33. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5B1.3(a).
34. Id. § 5D1.3(c)(10) (emphasis added).
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which the Fourth Amendment is restricted—sometimes radically so—for
parolees.
In deciding what conditions to impose, federal courts should consider,
among other things, whether the conditions are “reasonably related to” the
offense and the need to deter crime.35 According to federal statute,
conditions should “involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is
reasonably necessary.”36 However, as we shall see in Part II.A, Supreme
Court jurisprudence tolerates considerably more intrusive conditions than
the federal law provides.
Unlike the federal system, in New York the Board of Parole sets the
conditions of release.37 In addition to the typical conditions requiring
parolees to report and to refrain from committing crimes, the general
conditions of release also include a number of other provisions such as “I
will reply promptly, fully, and truthfully to any inquiry of, or
communication by, my Parole Officer,” and “I will permit my Parole
Officer to visit me at my residence and/or place of employment and I will
permit the search and inspection of my person, residence, and property.”38
Special conditions meant to enhance community safety while also
supporting the parolee’s reentry efforts may also be imposed.39 As we show
in Part III, these conditions can be so onerous that they can sometimes
encumber a parolee’s ability to find and maintain employment.40
Furthermore, New York parolees must promise to “not be in the
company of, or fraternize with any person I know to have a criminal record
or whom I know to have been adjudicated a Youthful Offender, except for
accidental encounters in public places, work, school, or in any other
instance with the permission of my Parole Officer.”41 As we show in Part
IV, there is a high variance between the saturation of parolees in different
35. Id. § 5B1.3(b).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). See also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3(b) (using
same language).
37. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.45(3) (McKinney 2009).
38. New York State Parole Handbook: Questions and Answers Concerning Parole Release and
Supervision, N.Y. STATE DEPARTMENT CORRECTIONS & COMMUNITY SUPERVISION § 3(6) (Sept. 2007)
[hereinafter Parole Handbook], https://www.parole.ny.gov/pdf/handbook6-09.pdf.
39. Peggy B. Burke, Collaboration for Successful Prisoner Reentry: The Role of Parole and the
Courts, CORR. MGMT. Q., Summer 2001, at 11, 14 (“Although some conditions are clearly aimed at
supporting the [individual] in transition, the total effect may be to create another layer of challenge to
what is an already daunting situation.”).
40. See Christine S. Scott-Hayward, The Failure of Parole: Rethinking the Role of the State in
Reentry, 41 N.M. L. REV. 421, 448 (2011) (recounting a parolee’s difficulties in attempting to find
employment while complying with reporting requirements).
41. Parole Handbook, supra note 38, § 3(6).
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zip codes of New York; for high-density parolee zip codes, a condition of
parole that prevents interactions with other parolees, let alone other
convicts in general, is quite difficult to comply with in practice.
C. REVOCATION OF PAROLE
Any violation of a release condition subjects the parolee to arrest42
and revocation of community supervision.43 In the federal system, a parole
officer can arrest a parolee without a warrant if the officer has probable
cause to believe that the individual has violated a condition of supervised
release.44 A court may also extend its jurisdiction over a parolee by issuing
a warrant or summons during the period of supervision.45 Sanctions for
violation of any release conditions range from a warning to full revocation
and re-imprisonment, regardless of whether the violation is based on the
commission of a new criminal offense or is merely a noncriminal technical
violation, such as failing to report or comply with a curfew.46
In determining the appropriate disposition, the court must consider the
same statutory factors it considered when imposing the initial sentence.47
Whether or not supervised release will be revoked depends upon the level
of the infraction.48 The two highest of three possible violation levels
require the court to revoke release49 while the third level does not require
revocation.50 If the court revokes release, the Guidelines suggest ranges for
the length of imprisonment.51
Since the court’s punishment for a violation of supervised release is
guided by the notion that the offender has committed a “breach” of the
court’s “trust,” the sentence only addresses the violation.52 If the violation
42. 18 U.S.C. § 3606 (2012) (providing that a person on supervised release or parole “may be
arrested” “[i]f there is probable cause to believe” he or she “has violated a condition of his . . . release”);
Parole Handbook, supra note 38, § 4. See also JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME:
PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 87 (2003) (discussing the consequences of a parole violation).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (“The court may [after considering certain factors] revoke a term of
supervised release, and require the defendant to serve [time] in prison . . . .”).
44. Id. § 3606. The arrest of a releasee for violating a term of his release is legal only if
supported by probable cause. United States v. Murguia-Oliveros, 421 F.3d 951, 952–53 (9th Cir. 2005)
(citing § 3606).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i).
46. Cecelia Klingele, Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1015, 1039–42 (2013).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).
48. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 7B1.1(a), 7B1.3 (2013).
49. Id. § 7B1.3(a)(1).
50. Id. § 7B1.3(a)(2).
51. Id. § 7B1.4(a).
52. Id. ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b), introductory cmt.
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is based upon new criminal conduct, punishment for that new conviction
rests in the hands of the court adjudicating that new charge. Furthermore, in
imposing a sentence for the violation, the court should consider, “to a
limited degree,” the “seriousness” of the violation and the offender’s
criminal history.53 The framework implies that “the sanction for the
violation of trust should be in addition, or consecutive, to any sentence
imposed for the new conduct.”54 In order to avoid double jeopardy and
other constitutional problems, courts tie the post-revocation sanction to the
original crime, rather than to the violation.55 We explore the Sixth
Amendment implications of these rules in Part II.B.
Should the parole officer opt for revocation, the parolee is entitled to
written notice of the violation and a hearing before a “neutral and
detached” body,56 and parolees can call witnesses and testify on their own
behalf.57 However, as we explore in detail in Part II.C, there are many other
aspects of the revocation process that permit considerably lowered Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights. In particular, parolees can be arrested
with or without a warrant;58 there is no right to appointed counsel at the
revocation hearing unless “fundamental fairness” requires it;59 the
government need only prove a violation by a preponderance of the
evidence;60 hearsay is generally admissible; and, at least in federal courts,
the exclusionary rule does not apply.61
Just as in the federal system, New York parole hearings are
administrative proceedings, and thus parolees can be sent to prison without
all of the protections normally attendant at criminal trials. When a parole
officer presents evidence that there is probable cause to believe that the
parolee has violated release conditions “in an important respect,” the parole
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 701 (2000) (“We therefore attribute postrevocation
penalties to the original conviction.”).
56. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486 (1972).
57. Id. at 487; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 (1973).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 3606 (2012) (providing that a person on supervised release or parole “may be
arrested” “[i]f there is probable cause to believe” he or she “has violated a condition of his . . . release”).
59. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790. See also infra Part II.C.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (providing that a court may modify or revoke supervised release if it
“finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised
release”). See also United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2008) (same); Parole
Handbook, supra note 38, § 4(10) (explaining that the same burden of proof applies for parole
revocation hearings in New York); infra Part II.C.1.
61. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998). See infra Part II.C.1 and 3.
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board or a designated officer can issue a parole violation warrant.62 Upon
arrest, bail is unavailable throughout the pendency of the revocation
process.63 After execution of the warrant, the parolee must be given written
notice of, among other things, the conditions allegedly violated.64
A preliminary hearing must be scheduled within fifteen days of the
arrest unless the parolee waives that entitlement.65 There is no right to
counsel at this hearing, although one may be provided for those who cannot
afford one.66 In this proceeding, a hearing officer determines whether there
is probable cause to believe that the parolee violated a condition of
release.67 If probable cause is found, the hearing officer can either schedule
a final revocation hearing or restore the parolee to supervision.68
A final revocation hearing must be held within ninety days of the
preliminary hearing or the date the parolee waived it.69 There is a right to
counsel at this hearing70 and the government need only prove the violation
by a preponderance of the evidence.71 If a violation of parole is found,
hearing officers have a number of dispositions at their disposal, including
restoring the parolee to supervision, incarcerating the parolee but allowing
for reinstatement of parole after a certain period of time has been served, or
incarcerating the parolee for the balance of the period remaining on his
parole, but for no more than five years, except in special cases.72 If
imprisonment is imposed, the parolee’s criminal history, the original crime
62.

N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(3)(a)(i) (McKinney 2010); Parole Handbook, supra note 38, § 4(1)–

(2).
63. Parole Handbook, supra note 38, § 4(3).
64. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(3)(c)(iii).
65. Id. § 259-i(3)(c)(i); Parole Handbook, supra note 38, § 4(3), (14). If there is a conviction on a
criminal charge that arises out of the same conduct as the alleged parole violation, this constitutes
probable cause that the parolee has violated a condition of release. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
9, § 8005.2(c) (2011).
66. Parole Handbook, supra note 38, § 4(6).
67. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(3)(c)(iv).
68. Id. § 259-i(3)(d).
69. Id. § 259-i(3)(f)(i). If the parolee is convicted of a felony and sentenced, parole is revoked by
law, so no preliminary or final revocation hearing is held. Parole Handbook, supra note 38, § 4(7).
70. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i (3)(f)(5).
71. Id. § 259-i(3)(f)(viii).
72. Id. § 259-i(3)(f)(x). See also id. § 259-i(3)(g) (“Revocation of presumptive release, parole,
conditional release or post-release supervision shall not prevent re-parole or re-release provided such reparole or re-release is not inconsistent with any other provisions of law.”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.45
(McKinney 2009) (setting forth periods of incarceration for violations of release); The Sentence Reform
Act of 1998—Jenna’s Law, N.Y. STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS & COMMUNITY SUPERVISION,
https://www.parole.ny.gov/legislation-jl.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2014) (“Violations of post-release
supervision may result in reincarceration for a fixed term between six months and the unserved balance
of the post-release supervision term, not to exceed five years.”).
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of conviction, the number of prior violations, and the current violative
behavior determine the range of imprisonment.73 For some serious
offenses, there can be a mandatory term of at least fifteen months.74
In New York, then, parolees facing revocation hearings can be held up
to 105 days pending the hearing, and can face additional years of
imprisonment if a violation is established. Yet all this occurs under a lower
burden of proof and without all of the usual procedural protections that
accompany such lengthy terms of incarceration.
D. PAROLE AND RECIDIVISM
At the end of 2011, there were approximately 853,900 people on
parole in the United States, with 1.1 million in the parole system at some
stage during the year.75 The vast majority were state parolees—744,700,
compared to 103,800 federal releasees—but the number of parolees in both
jurisdictions is increasing.76
Historical trends indicate that many of those released on parole will be
reincarcerated. Parolees serving time as a result of a revocation make up
over half of the jail population and over one-third of the prison
population.77 Only about half of parolees complete their terms of
supervision, including those who are discharged early.78 Reincarceration
rates vary by year and by study, but a significant number of parolees are
reincarcerated—42% of parolees returned to jail or prison during their
parole term in 2000;79 in 2006, 16% of parolees were reincarcerated;80 and
in 2011, 20% were reincarcerated, 5% with a new sentence and 13% due to
73.
74.
75.

Parole Handbook, supra note 38, § 4(11).
Id. § 4(12).
LAURA M. MARUSCHAK & ERIKA PARKS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION AND
PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011, at 1 (2012), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/ppus11.pdf.
76. During 2011, the state parole population grew 1.1 percent while the federal population grew
5.1 percent. Id. During that time, parole entries declined by 3.4 percent but exits declined even more, by
5.3 percent. Id.
77. Klingele, supra note 46, at 5, 17 (using data from PEGGY BURKE ET AL., PEW CTR. ON
STATES, WHEN OFFENDERS BREAK THE RULES: SMART RESPONSES TO PAROLE AND PROBATION
VIOLATIONS 1 (2007)).
78. MARUSCHAK & PARKS, supra note 75, at 1.
79. TIMOTHY HUGHES & DORIS JAMES WILSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, REENTRY
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES (2004), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
reentry.pdf.
80. LAUREN E. GLAZE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION
AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2006, at 7 (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/ppus06.pdf.
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revocation.81 The numbers may vary, but consistently “a major proportion
of offenders failing upon reentry—and returning to prison—are doing so as
a result of parole violations and revocations.”82
Many revocations are based upon technical violations rather than the
commission of new crimes.83 In fact, in some states, technical violations
make up the majority of revocations.84 As one parole officer put it:
[M]ost of our violations are technical . . . . I mean, if you can’t
write up a report, and cite at least a technical violation, you’re not
really struggling very hard, because there are so many conditions.
There’s got to be something that the guy didn’t do right, right?”85
Consequently, the various parole conditions effectively give police
officers and parole offices enormous discretion over parolees’ fates—a
form of leverage we explore in Part III.B.
E. HOW TO ASSESS THE MERITS OF THE PAROLE SYSTEM
From the individual’s point of view, it may seem obvious that even
with massive restrictions imposed during the period of parole, parole
overall nevertheless operates as a positive for convicts because it gets them
out of jail. One problem with this conclusion is that in the federal system,
parole adds an additional term to a convict’s sentence, rather than reducing
it. Given resource constraints, prison overcrowding, and goals of optimal
sentencing,86 it is unlikely that in the absence of parole, sentences would
81.
82.

MARUSCHAK & PARKS, supra note 75, at 1.
PEGGY BURKE & MICHAEL TONRY, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB. POLICY, SUCCESSFUL
TRANSITION AND REENTRY FOR SAFER COMMUNITIES: A CALL TO ACTION FOR PAROLE 7 (2006),
available at http://www.cepp.com/documents/A%20Call%20to%20Action%20for%20Parole.pdf.
83. PEW CTR. ON STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF AMERICA’S
PRISONS 13–14 (2011), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/
Reports/sentencing_and_corrections/State_Recidivism_Revolving_Door_America_Prisons%20.pdf
(showing that across 33 states, 25.5% of parolees returned to prison for technical violations, whereas
only 19.9% returned for new crimes).
84. E.g., PEW CTR. ON STATES, WHEN OFFENDERS BREAK THE RULES: SMART RESPONSES TO
PAROLE AND PROBATION VIOLATIONS 3 (2007), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/
uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_corrections/Condition-Violators-Briefing.pdf
(“A significant number of returns . . . are solely for violations of the conditions of probation or
parole . . . . In some states, these so-called ‘technical’ or ‘condition’ violators account for more than half
of all those returned to prison.”); B.J. Reyes, Isle Parole Failure Rate 43%: A Study Finds That the
Majority of Revocations Were for Technical Reasons, Such as Drug Violations, Rather Than for New
Convictions, HONOLULU STAR-BULL. (Aug. 16, 2001), http://archives.starbulletin.com/
2001/08/16/news/index.html.
85. Klingele, supra note 46, at 1035.
86. An extensive economic literature exists that analyzes the most efficient and effective
mechanisms of deterring crime by varying the extent of punishment, and other factors. See, e.g., James
Andreoni, Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?
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remain as high as the combined parole and nonparole period of existing
sentences. Even putting this thought experiment aside, the fact that most
parolees are returned to prison for technical violations of their parole
conditions does not mean that at worst parole simply returns them to
neutral. The next subpart shows that parole violations can ultimately cause
individuals to serve longer sentences than they would without parole, even
extending sentences beyond the legislative maximum. So it is not clear that
parole actually reduces prison sentences.
Furthermore, the parole system worsens the institutionalization of
individuals—parole contributes to the recidivism statistics described above,
not simply because technical violations are easy to establish, but because
the extensive parole conditions that we describe in Part III.B make parolees
vulnerable to criminal influences. Thus, even for parolees whose initial
sentences are shortened, if parole contributes to the probability of their
return to prison, that sentence reduction does them little good.
The Supreme Court justifies stringent parole conditions as a Faustian
bargain to which the parolees may choose to consent.87 In fact, as we have
seen, parole is often a mandatory addition to a sentence, so the consent
argument is misleading. Furthermore, parole conditions have become so
onerous as to be counterproductive, leading to greater reincarceration.
Thus, whether parole’s partial freedom trumps prison’s complete
incarceration may actually be the wrong way to look at the question, since
a parolee’s relative freedom may be illusory.
Nevertheless, in discretionary cases, the individual may think
probabilistically that he can beat these odds, and we may want to allow him
to make that calculation, given his greater knowledge about his character
and prospects of successful reentry under parole. But while a parolee may
be free to consent to stringent and potentially counterproductive conditions,
the community in which he resides does not have the same choice. We
show in Part II.A that the rights of the community are also adversely
affected by the parole system, and in Part IV we show that the broader
neighborhoods in which parolees cluster are targeted by the police for
nonrandom stops at a significantly higher rate. The Supreme Court may be
22 RAND J. ECON. 385, 393 (1991) (theorizing that “increasing penalties may actually increase crime
rates”); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders,
46 J. PUB. ECON. 291, 302-03 (1991) (arguing that maximal deterrence may require variation in
punishment levels on an individual basis); Steven Shavell, A Model of Optimal Incapacitation, 77 AM.
ECON. REV. 107, 109 (1987) (noting that the optimal sentence may change based on whether the goal of
incarceration is either incapacitation or deterrence).
87. See infra Part II.B.
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willing to infer consent on behalf of the parolee, but surely it cannot extend
that inference to the broader community.
Ultimately, we are not proposing that parole in and of itself is
necessarily problematic, but the existing parole system is deeply flawed.
Parole as it actually operates in the United States today is not the
reintegrative, sentence-reducing mechanism that most of us think it is.
Parole conditions are so harsh that they undermine the reintegrative goals
of parole, do not reduce sentences, and harm the constitutional rights of
both individual parolees and the communities in which they live.
II. IMPACT ON THE PAROLEE: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
In this part, we examine the parole jurisprudence and demonstrate the
adverse impact it has on the constitutional rights of both parolees and the
broader community. Subpart A begins with the Fourth Amendment,
showing how parole jurisprudence undermines the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures not only for individual parolees but also
for their families and cotenants. Subpart B turns to the Sixth Amendment,
showing that parole can extend parolees’ sentences, even beyond the
legislatively allowed maximum. Subpart C explores the detrimental effect
on procedural rights, including evidentiary rules, revocation and bail, the
exclusionary rule, and Miranda rights.
Although the prior literature has addressed most of these issues in
isolation, they have seldom, if ever, been considered in terms of their
collective effect on atrophying constitutional rights. Pulling all the threads
of parole jurisprudence together challenges the common assumption that
parole provides a helpful mechanism for the reintegration of criminal
offenders into the community.
A. ATTRITION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS FOR INDIVIDUALS AND
COMMUNITIES
The Fourth Amendment applies to parolees, but only in a considerably
weakened form. The courts have allowed numerous punitive conditions to
be placed on parolees as part of the bargain with the state that lets them exit
prison early.
1. Samson and the Abolition of the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that people on parole have
diminished expectations of privacy that can justify searches and seizures
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without the typical probable cause and warrant requirements.88 Unlike
searches and seizures of ordinary citizens, searches and seizures of parolees
need only be reasonable.89 Thus, not only are warrantless searches possible,
but police do not need, as they ordinarily would, facts and circumstances
that would make a “man of reasonable caution” sufficiently certain that an
offense has been committed.90 Instead, reasonableness requires only a
balance between “on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for
the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”91 Furthermore, in
Samson v. California, the Supreme Court deemed parolees to have such a
diminished expectation of privacy that even suspicionless searches can be
authorized.92
The Samson rule provides little restriction on police searches. Parolees
can be made subject to privacy infringements that may not be reasonable if
they involved ordinary citizens,93 including requiring all parolees to agree
to be subject to searches at any time by police and parole officers in order
to be eligible for release.94 These intrusions need only be made pursuant to
a rule or regulation “that itself satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness requirement,”95 and must also be “clearly expressed” to the
parolee.96 That is, police do not automatically have the power to search
parolees without suspicion, but legislatures can so empower them, and the
88. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006) (“The extent and reach of [parole] conditions
clearly demonstrate that parolees . . . have severely diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their
status alone.”).
89. Samson, 547 U.S. at 847 (quoting People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 450 (Cal. 1998)) (affirming
the California Court of Appeal’s holdings that “suspicionless searches of parolees are lawful under
California law” and that “[s]uch a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as
long as it is not arbitrary, capricious or harassing” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Pa. Bd. of Prob.
& Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998) (implicitly recognizing the right of parolees to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures). See also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (same,
discussing probationers).
90. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 322 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Stacey
v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878)) (“If the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to
warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been committed, it is
sufficient.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
91. Samson, 547 U.S. at 848 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2005)).
92. Id. at 847.
93. Id. at 863 (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Grimes, 225 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2000)
(“[W]e hold that, like probation, parole justifies some departure from traditional Fourth Amendment
standards.”).
94. Samson, 547 U.S. at 852 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067(a) (West 2000)).
95. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
96. Samson, 547 U.S. at 852 (“[T]he parole search condition under California law—requiring
inmates who opt for parole to submit to suspicionless searches by a parole officer . . . was ‘clearly
expressed’ to petitioner.”).
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legislation itself is only subject to a reasonableness test.
The reasonableness test offers little meaningful restriction on what
legislatures can make parolees subject to. In justifying its lax standard, the
Samson Court characterized parole as one form of punishment on a
continuum, ranging from imprisonment to relative freedom.97
“[A]n . . . inmate may serve his parole period either in physical custody”—
with all of the restrictions that apply in prison—or else he may “elect to
complete his sentence out of physical custody and subject to certain
conditions.”98 The Court, then, is characterizing parole, regardless of the
extent of the conditions associated with it, as a partial reprieve that
prisoners voluntarily consent to, since prison is the alternative.
Under Samson, suspicionless searches are almost always reasonable
for two reasons. First, the expectation of privacy of parolees is severely
diminished because the “extent and reach of these conditions clearly
demonstrate that parolees like petitioner have severely diminished
expectations of privacy by virtue of their status alone.”99 On the Court’s
circular reasonable expectation of privacy logic, the fact that so many
conditions are placed on parolees shows that they must have diminished
expectations of privacy, which in turn renders punitive conditions
reasonable. Second, by characterizing the conditions as minimally
intrusive—since the alternative is prison rather than freedom—the Court
minimizes the intrusiveness of any police action. In contrast, the
countervailing state interests are considered substantial, since the very high
recidivism rate among parolees demonstrates that “most parolees are ill
prepared to handle the pressures of reintegration. Thus, most parolees
require intense supervision.”100 However, we show below how punitive
parole conditions actually contribute to likely recidivism.
In addition to the above justifications, the Court intimates that
parolees can offer no serious constitutional objection to parole conditions
because they consented to those conditions. Such consent was indicated by
the fact that the inmate “signed an order submitting to the condition and
thus was ‘unambiguously’ aware of it . . . . [His] acceptance of a clear and
unambiguous search condition ‘significantly diminished [his] reasonable
expectation of privacy.’”101 As we have seen, parole periods are often
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 850.
Id. at 851.
Id. at 852.
Id. at 854 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2005)).
Id. at 852.
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mandatory, and so the consent justification is often inapt; in addition, we
will see in subpart B below that the core benefit assumed to arise from
parole—reduced sentences—can be illusory, and so this inferred consent is
difficult to characterize as truly knowing.
It is unclear whether New York takes full advantage of Samson’s
authorization of suspicionless searches. New York’s parole regulations
permit warrantless searches, but whether they allow suspicionless searches
of parolees is still an open question. In New York, a parolee signs a consent
form upon release to permit his parole officer to visit him and to “permit
the search and inspection of his person, residence and property.”102 But the
New York courts have held that this is not an unconditional consent to any
search, applying it only to those conditions that are “rationally and
reasonably” related to the parole officer’s duty.103 The burden is on the
state to show that the parolee consented to the search.104 This includes
showing that the consent is voluntary and free from implicit or express
coercion.105 In Part III.B, we demonstrate that even though New York law
may not fully replicate Samson’s full permissiveness, parolees nonetheless
find themselves subject to intensive police leverage.
2. Samson Meets Randolph: Loss of Privacy for Family and Cotenants of
Parolees
Parole not only reduces the Fourth Amendment rights of individual
parolees, but also it erodes the constitutional protections of anyone the
parolee happens to live with. It is well established that joint occupants with
equal authority to control access to shared residences can consent to
searches of common areas and jointly occupied areas.106 What is not settled
is whether, given Samson’s permissive attitude toward police searches of
parolees’ persons and their homes, individuals who live with parolees face
a loss of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.
The potential attrition of nonparolee Fourth Amendment interests
through the combination of the common authority rules with Samson’s
presumption of consent is somewhat lightened, though certainly not
negated, by the Supreme Court’s decision in Georgia v. Randolph.107 That
102. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8003.2(d) (2011).
103. People v. Huntley, 371 N.E.2d 794, 796–97 (N.Y. 1977); People v. Tony, 914 N.Y.S.2d 585,
592 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
104. Tony, 914 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
105. People v. Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d 575, 580 (N.Y. 1976).
106. See infra Part III.B.1.
107. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
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ruling partially limited the scope of the common authority rule, holding that
“a physically present inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a police
search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow
occupant.”108 This means that any evidence found in a search cannot be
used against the nonconsenting party, when the latter is present and
objecting. Randolph thus raises questions about the effect of Samson on
nonparolees in the home, but we argue it offers little meaningful protection
for nonparolees living with parolees.
If two cohabitants are present, one of whom consents to an otherwise
unjustified search while the other “expressly refuses to consent,” the
“refusal . . . prevails, rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and
invalid as to him.”109 But this quote illustrates the considerable limits of
Randolph’s protection for nonparolees living with parolees, in two ways.
First, it only applies when both individuals are present and able to object—
otherwise, the ordinary common authority rule prevails. Second, Randolph
only renders use of such searches as against the nonconsenting nonparolee
impermissible; it does not prevent the search from taking place. Thus it
does little to protect nonparolees living with parolees from unreasonable
searches and seizures actually being conducted. As described below, this
area of the law has previously been criticized for providing little protection
from unreasonable searches, since numerous exceptions to the exclusionary
rule allow evidence to be indirectly used against an individual for whom it
cannot be used directly, such as for credibility purposes.110 This is
particularly true in the parole context, since Samson gives an inference of
all-but-blanket consent to searches of parolees’ homes. Moreover, the
implied consent of the parolee appears to foreclose the possibility that the
nonparolee cotenant can obtain any remedy for unjustified searches under
federal civil rights laws.
In Thornton v. Lund, for example, a court rejected the argument that
an officer’s reasonable belief that a parolee lived at a residence diminished
the nonparolee cohabitants’ Fourth Amendment rights.111 But even so, the
court noted that the search was valid as against the parolee,112 refused to
allow the nonparolee’s nonconsent to prevent searches such as this, and
108. Id. at 122–23. See also People v. Perez, 951 N.Y.S.2d 335, 344 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (citing
Randolph, 547 U.S. at 114) (“The police may not, however, search a residence, even with the consent of
one resident, when a co-occupant is physically present and refuses to consent.”).
109. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106.
110. See infra Part II.B.1.
111. Thornton v. Lund, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1056–57 (E.D. Wis. 2008).
112. Id. at 1059 n.4.
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also granted a summary dismissal of the nonparolee’s § 1983 damages
claim.113 If anything, then, the Randolph compromise of allowing a search
but preventing its use legitimates the process of searching the homes of
nonparolees living with parolees.
So Randolph does little to limit unreasonable searches actually taking
place; combined with the fact that Randolph does not even apply unless a
cotenant happens to be present, this means that Samson’s narrow reading of
parolee rights has considerable potential adverse impacts on parolees’
families and cotenants. When it is considered that at any time, one in three
African American men are under some form of criminal justice
supervision,114 the potential impact of Samson amounts to potentially
lowered rights for entire neighborhoods. Our empirical analysis in Part IV
supports this conclusion.
It is also worth considering the feedback effect that Samson’s attrition
of community rights has back onto the parolee. As will be discussed in Part
III.B, stable housing and social and familial relationships are the best
predictors of successful reintegration of parolees, but people just released
from prison typically will not have the financial resources to pay the rent,
and even if they could, landlords may be loath to rent to people with
criminal records. Many parolees will have difficulty finding employment
for the same reason, and it can be difficult to find jobs that do not conflict
with their reporting requirements. Furthermore, federal laws severely
restrict the ability of individuals with felony convictions for drugs or
violence from living in public housing115 and receiving public benefits.116
Thus, most parolees must rely on others to provide them with a place to
live. However, the constant risk of state intervention created by Samson is a
113. Id. at 1060 (“Given that [parolee William] consented to searches of his residence as a
condition of parole and defendants reasonably believed that William lived with plaintiffs, it was
reasonable for defendants to believe that they could lawfully search plaintiffs’ home over their
objections. As such, defendants are immune from damages liability.” (citation omitted)).
114. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 13661(c) (2006) (allowing local housing authorities to refuse housing to people
“engaged in any drug-related or violent criminal activity”); id. § 13663(a) (prohibiting admission of
“any individual who is subject to a lifetime registration requirement” to federally assisted housing); 24
C.F.R. § 960.204(a)(3)–(4) (2012) (applying the same to registered sex offenders and individuals with
convictions for the manufacture of methamphetamine). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2006)
(permitting housing authorities to evict residents for “drug-related criminal activity on or off such
premises” by tenants or guests of tenants); Gwen Rubenstein & Debbie Mukamal, Welfare and
Housing—Denial of Benefits to Drug Offenders, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 37, 48 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002)
(discussing the effects of federal housing policies excluding people with criminal records).
116. Federal law imposes a lifetime ban on the receipt of welfare and food stamps for those with a
felony drug conviction. 21 U.S.C. § 862a(a) (2012).
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significant disincentive for others to share their homes with parolees.117
Consequently, parole conditions can actually undermine the social and
familial relationships integral to successful reentry.118
B. FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENT ATTRITION: PAROLE AS EXTENDING
SENTENCES
This subpart describes the statutory and constitutional justifications
for the rulings that allow parole to extend sentences, and why this outcome
has been held to not violate the Sixth Amendment and other constitutional
criminal procedure protections. We provide a number of critiques of the
courts’ reasoning in developing this jurisprudence, showing how it is
internally inconsistent. But the ultimate purpose of this subpart is to place
this jurisprudence in the broader context of the counter-productively
punitive institution of parole, which undermines parole’s reintegrative
aims.
1. Statutory Empowerment for Reimprisonment Beyond a Term
Authorized by the Conviction Statute
The federal supervised release statute permits reincarceration of an
offender for all or part of the remaining time on his supervised release,119
from one up to five years depending on the class of the original offense.120
The courts have interpreted this statutory power as permitting them to
incarcerate an individual for a prison term that, together with time already
served by the parolee, exceeds the total allowed by the statute of
conviction. Defendants have challenged these sentences both for
improperly interpreting the federal statutes and on constitutional
grounds.121 This section examines the statutory issues; the next section
117. Alice Goffman, On the Run: Wanted Men in a Philadelphia Ghetto, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 339,
350 (2009).
118. James M. Binnall, Released from Prison . . . but Placed in Solitary Confinement: A Parolee
Reveals the Practical Ramifications of Samson v. California, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 65, 86 (2008) (“Suspicionless searches ended my ability to choose with whom to share
the intimate details of my life . . . . Secrecy and withdrawal again dominate my life. ”); Donna Lee Elm,
Limits on the Search Waiver Term, PERSP.: J. AM. PROBATION & PAROLE ASS’N, Spring 2003, at 42, 42
(“Throughout the United States, probationers and parolees are subject to release conditions requiring
them to submit to search and seizure by authorities.”).
119. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012) (providing that a court may require a defendant to serve in
prison “all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in
such term of supervised release”).
120. The maximum term of re-imprisonment is also limited by the class of the original offense. A
class A felony has a five year maximum; a class B felony three years; a class C or D felony two years;
and one year for any other kind of offense. Id.
121. See, e.g., United States v. Jamison, 934 F.2d 371, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (examining both
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examines the constitutional arguments.
The courts have discretion over the combined length of parolees’
sentences, as they may choose whether to impose concurrent or consecutive
sentences of imprisonment for a violation of supervised release, based on a
list of factors,122 and the court has the choice to not give credit for time
previously served on post-release supervision.123 However, the Sentencing
Guidelines are more categorical and stricter, providing that if a court
imprisons a parolee for violating a condition of release, the sentence shall
be served consecutively, even if the sentence being served was imposed for
the very conduct that violated the terms of release.124 Although the
Sentencing Guidelines constitute only a nonbinding policy statement,125
they were intended to encourage consecutive, and thus longer, sentences.126
Courts have interpreted the combination of these provisions as
empowering them to sentence individuals to prison terms that, in total,
exceed the legislative maximum provided for in the relevant statute of
conviction.127 In many instances, courts have exploited this power,
sentencing parolees to terms of re-imprisonment which, when added to
their initial incarceration, exceed the length permitted by the statute of
conviction.128
The statute of conviction typically specifies the maximum time
someone can be imprisoned for the crime. Sentences for supervised release
violations relate back to the original offense.129 Therefore, a number of
defendants have argued, the prison sentence for a release violation cannot,
as a matter of statutory interpretation, exceed the maximum length
statutory and Constitutional challenges to this sort of sentence); United States v. Purvis, 940 F.2d 1276,
1278 (9th Cir. 1991) (same).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (listing factors); id. § 3583(c) (referring to § 3553(a)). See also supra
Part I.
123. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
124. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B1.3(f) (2013).
125. United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195, 208 (6th Cir. 2011).
126. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B1.3(f) & cmt. 4.
127. See, e.g., United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 488–91 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that the facts
underlying a revocation of supervised release that exceeds the maximum sentence need not be proven
beyond reasonable doubt).
128. See, e.g., United States v. McIntosh, 630 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 2011) (“In McIntosh’s case,
adding his second reimprisonment (16 months) to his initial imprisonment (41 months) and the
reimprisonment from the first violation of supervised release (14 months) gives a total of 71 months.
This, of course, is greater than the 60–month statutory maximum authorized for his original offense.”).
129. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 701 (2000) (“We therefore attribute postrevocation
penalties to the original conviction.”).
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provided in the statute of conviction.130
The core difficulty with this argument is that the conviction statute is
not the sole source of legal authority for imprisoning an offender. In
addition, the supervised release statute provides an independent basis for
sentencing an offender to a term of release, and, if he violates its
restrictions, to additional imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit captured the
central statutory issue succinctly, stating:
[A] district court’s authority to sentence is not based solely on [the
statute of conviction], but on 18 U.S.C. § 3583 as well. That is to
say, by statute, a district court is not restricted to only imposing a
sentence of up to 60 months; instead, by statute, a district court
may impose a 60-month sentence plus a three-year term of
supervised release, which may include an additional
reimprisonment of up to two years should the defendant violate
terms of the supervised release.131
Every other circuit addressing the issue has reached the same
conclusion.132
2. Reimprisonment Beyond a Term Authorized by the Conviction Statute:
Constitutional Issues
Reimprisonment beyond the term authorized by the explicit text of the
statute under which the defendant is convicted would seem to be directly at
odds with a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment’s procedural rights, the
Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against double jeopardy, and the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments’ requirement of due process. However, the courts
have turned back all constitutional challenges to § 3583, allowing sentences
of imprisonment that exceed the maximum allowed by the conviction
130. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1282, 1283 (10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the
defendant’s statutory argument that “because he had served the maximum sentence (five years)
provided by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the judge had no authority to impose an additional term of
imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3583”).
131. McIntosh, 630 F.3d at 702. See also United States v. Hoffman, 733 F. Supp. 314, 315 (D.
Alaska 1990) (“Other statutory provisions [than the sentencing provisions], of equal dignity, provide for
the possibility of additional time in prison amounting to a total in excess of one year.”).
132. E.g., United States v. Cunningham, 607 F.3d 1264, 1266–68 (11th Cir. 2010); United States
v. Johnson, 356 F. App’x 785, 790–92 (6th Cir. 2009) (unpublished opinion); United States v. Cordova,
461 F.3d 1184, 1186–88 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Huerta–Pimental, 445 F.3d 1220, 1224–25
(9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 854–55 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Carlton,
442 F.3d 802, 807–10 (2d Cir. 2006); Work, 409 F.3d at 489–92. See also United States v. Wirth, 250
F.3d 165, 170 n.3 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[It is a] well-settled rule that punishment for a violation of
supervised release, when combined with punishment for the original offense, may exceed the statutory
maximum for the underlying substantive offense.”).
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statute to stand.133 The focus of these decisions has not been on the length
of the resulting sentence per se,134 but rather on parolees’ procedural rights
at their violation hearings.
a. Right to jury trial
The most frequent challenges to violation sentences that exceed the
conviction statute’s maximum are based on the right to a jury trial
recognized in a series of Supreme Court cases culminating in Apprendi v.
New Jersey135 and United States v. Booker.136 In these cases, the Court held
that the Constitution’s guarantee of the right to a jury trial prohibits the
imposition of sentences above the statutory maximum other than those
based on facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.137 Applying this
principle, the Court invalidated several mandatory sentencing schemes,
although it allowed judges to impose a sentence on preponderant evidence
if the guidelines were merely advisory.138 Since the supervised release
statute permits a judge to reincarcerate someone beyond the maximum
permitted by the conviction statute without a jury and with only
preponderant evidence, parolees have argued that the statute infringes the
right to a jury trial recognized in Apprendi and Booker.139
i. Judicial Fact-Finding
One basis for arguing that these revocation sentences violate the
Apprendi-Booker principle is that the statute authorizing them allows a
judge to punish someone without a jury determination and with only
preponderant evidence. The courts have consistently rejected this challenge
by asserting that the constitutionality of the whole sentence is a function of
the constitutionality of each of its various parts.140 One part is the
“incarcerative term” authorized by the conviction statute; the other part is
133. Carlton, 442 F.3d at 809 (noting some tension between the supervised release statute and the
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial).
134. The Court generally avoids “articulat[ing] the scope of the constitutional interest in the
substantive criminal law.” Ronald J. Allen & Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker:
Constitutional Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 195, 199 (2005).
135. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
136. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
137. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
138. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 442 F.3d 802, 807 (“Appellant asserts that § 3583(e)(3) is
invalid as applied to him because it empowers a district court to revoke his term of supervised release
without a jury trial and based on findings that are not proved beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of
his constitutional rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution.”).
140. United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 490 (1st Cir. 2005).
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the supervised release term authorized by the supervised release statute.141
Rather than considering these two parts of the sentence together and
assessing their constitutionality, the courts have simply asked whether each
element is constitutional standing alone, ignoring the cumulative impact of
the two parts.
In United States v. Work, for instance, the First Circuit reasoned that at
the sentencing stage, the incarceration term was supported by the facts
admitted by the defendant during his guilty plea and thus there was no
violation of the jury trial right.142 Furthermore, at the time he was
sentenced, the supervised release statute permitted the court to sentence
him to supervised release for up to three years. “Since . . . the supervised
release statute . . . authorized the court to impose a supervised release term
of that duration based solely on the facts admitted in the guilty plea,” the
supervised release term also did not violate the defendant’s right to a jury
trial.143
Having found that the original sentencing court did not violate the
defendant’s jury trial right, the Work court then turned its attention to the
revocation of supervised release. The court argued that the Apprendi
principle does not apply at the revocation stage because “violation of
supervised release is not a separate fact creating an additional penalty on
top of a defendant’s original sentence that may go beyond the statutory
maximum.”144 Rather, the “possibility of reimprisonment after a violation”
was “part of the original sentence” to begin with.145 Since the possibility of
reimprisonment was in the sentence from the start, it cannot be considered
“an additional penalty on top of” the original sentence.146
The court acknowledged that the revocation judge extended the
offender’s imprisonment after he found release violations by a mere
preponderance of the evidence, but concluded that this did not infringe the
right to jury trial as recognized by the Supreme Court because the Sixth
Amendment does not apply to revocation hearings.147 Since the releasee
has already been convicted of a crime, he need not be “accorded” the same
141. Id. at 489.
142. Id. at 491.
143. Id.
144. United States v. McIntosh, 630 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 2011).
145. Id.
146. Id. See also United States v. Huerta-Pimental, 445 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“[I]mposition of imprisonment following the revocation of supervised release is part of the original
sentence authorized by the fact of conviction and does not constitute additional punishment beyond the
statutory maximum.”).
147. Work, 409 F.3d at 491 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
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“panoply of due process protections” as a criminal defendant.148 Essentially
the Work and other courts argue that since revocation occurs subsequent to
conviction, they need not address whether the actual imposition of the
additional term through revocation violates the Constitution, since the Sixth
Amendment does not apply.
Thus the court was arguing first that it is permissible to impose a
potential additional incarceration term at sentencing that might exceed the
statutory maximum for the crime of conviction if imposed, and second that
it is permissible to impose the additional term of actualized incarceration at
the revocation stage, on a preponderance of the evidence and without a jury
determination, because the Sixth Amendment no longer applies at the
revocation stage.
The two justifications are at odds with one another. To justify the
sentence at the sentencing stage, the court insists that the two elements of
the sentence must be considered separately. However, to justify the
sentence at the revocation stage, the court insists that the two elements
must be considered together. If the implicit factual claim in the second
argument—that the two aspects of sentencing are one and the same—is
accurate, then this directly challenges the evidentiary rule that permits
incarceration upon only a preponderance of the evidence.
Also, the court avoided the underlying question at the sentencing
stage, by leaping from the Booker conclusion that the guidelines cannot be
mandatory if they are constitutional to the conclusion that therefore
extending sentences beyond the maximum is not a constitutional
violation.149 But it never actually elucidated why, if the revocation term is
part of the original sentence, then it need not be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt at the first stage. The court then avoided the substance of
that argument at the revocation stage, only because the Sixth Amendment
does not apply to the revocation. But this only follows if the imposition of
the two sentences are separate events—contrary to its earlier position.
Nevertheless, other courts have followed this approach.150
148. Id. at 492.
149. Id. at 492 (“[T]he portions of the sentencing guidelines dealing with revocation of supervised
release are merely policy statements. Even before Booker, those guidelines were deemed advisory
rather than mandatory . . . . Consequently, resort to them cannot constitute Booker error.” (citations
omitted)).
150. See, e.g., United States v. McIntosh, 630 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[S]upervised
release, and the subsequent possibility of reimprisonment after a violation of that release, is a part of the
original sentence imposed by the sentencing court following a defendant’s conviction by a jury based
on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
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Some courts have recognized the conflict between the § 3583
jurisprudence and the Apprendi-Booker principle. In United States v.
Carlton, the Second Circuit upheld a revocation sentence but
acknowledged some “tension” between its ruling and the right to a jury
determination of all relevant facts.151 According to the Carlton court, the
tension arises because, despite the Supreme Court’s contrary assertion, a
court “cannot fully attribute the penalty imposed at a revocation hearing to
the original conviction.”152 The facts that justify revocation occur after
conviction, and certainly “a jury cannot find facts which the law makes
essential to the punishment . . . if those facts have not yet occurred.”153
Courts are not like the police unit in Minority Report, which can incarcerate
offenders for “future murder.”
Nonetheless, the Carlton court ultimately concluded that there is no
violation of the right to jury trial at the revocation hearing because “a
sentence of supervised release by its terms involves a surrender of certain
constitutional rights and this includes surrender of the due process rights
articulated in Apprendi and its progeny.”154 Thus the ultimate justification
for the failure of the right to jury fact-finding as protecting against
sentences extending beyond the legislative maximum comes down to a
notion of the parolee having impliedly consented to the framework of
conditions imposed by the state, however punitive it may be. This argument
circularly concludes that the Constitution is not violated because courts can
presume consent to a system that would violate offenders’ constitutional
rights but for that consent. We see below that problems with this logic
continue to arise when violations of other constitutional provisions are
considered, in particular the prohibition on double jeopardy.155
ii. Mandatory Guidelines
A distinct, though closely related, Apprendi challenge to revocation
sentences contends that judges’ revocation decisions are mandatory under
the Sentencing Guidelines. The answer to this challenge is the same as that
proffered by Booker as to why the Sentencing Guidelines in general did not
violate Apprendi: the Sentencing Guidelines for revocation were merely
advisory before Booker and remained so after.156 Others have argued that
151.
152.
153.
omitted).
154.
155.
156.

United States v. Carlton, 442 F.3d 802, 808 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 809.
Id. (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304 (2004)) (internal quotation marks
Id.
See infra Part II.B.2.b.
United States v. Huerta-Pimental, 445 F.3d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Because the
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this claim in Booker was a disingenuous legalism manufactured to avoid
the practical difficulties of the Sentencing Guidelines being
unconstitutional under Apprendi,157 and we will not reiterate the argument
here.
b. Double Jeopardy
Courts have appealed to some of the same nuances of release
revocation to reject double jeopardy challenges. The relevant aspect of the
right against double jeopardy “protects [a defendant] against multiple
punishments for the same offense.”158 Courts have circumvented this
double jeopardy restriction on expanding sentences beyond the statutory
maximum based on the rationale that although parole revocation relates
back to the original offense, it is not a second punishment implicating
double jeopardy because it merely “modifie[s]” the original sentence.159
Imprisonment for a violation is not a new punishment, on this logic, but is
rather only one “part of the whole matrix of punishment which arises out of
a defendant’s original crime.”160
This factual characterization of parole revocation, and why it does not
violate double jeopardy, is directly at odds with the factual characterization
used to justify why parole revocation does not violate the right to jury trial.
Previously, we saw that the courts justified parole revocation on the basis
that the possibility of reimprisonment was part of the original sentence to
begin with. Now, the court is saying that the second punishment, parole
revocation, is a modification of the original sentence. If the latter claim is
true, then the imposition of that sentence without proof beyond reasonable
doubt by a jury becomes problematic again.
c. The Indictment Clause
The courts are split on whether the extension of sentencing via parole
might conflict with the Indictment Clause of the Constitution.161 The
revocation of supervised release and the subsequent imposition of additional imprisonment is, and
always has been, fully discretionary, it is constitutional under Booker.”); United States v. Dees, 467
F.3d 847, 854 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting a Booker challenge to a sentence under § 3583(e)(3) and citing
the advisory character of the revocation guidelines).
157. E.g., Allen & Hastert, supra note 134, at 198–200.
158. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (citing cases).
159. United States v. Pettus, 303 F.3d 480, 487 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The requirement that a defendant
only be punished once for a particular crime does not mean that this punishment cannot be modified or
extended.”).
160. United States v. Amer, 110 F.3d 873, 884 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Paskow,
11 F.3d 873, 883 (9th Cir. 1993)).
161. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury . . . .”).
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Indictment Clause requires the government to indict defendants for
offenses that “carry an authorized term of imprisonment of over one
year.”162 Thus, the initial imposition of supervised release at sentencing is
relevant to the Indictment Clause if the combined terms exceed one year,
because supervised release necessarily contains the “possibility” that it will
be “ultimately revoked.”163 However, other authority permits charging a
misdemeanor that carries a penalty of one year of incarceration and one
year of supervised release without an indictment.164 Since the possibility of
reimprisonment is included in supervised release, this authority entails the
permissibility of revoking supervised release without an indictment.
The problem with the latter view is that it provides a way around the
Indictment Clause for any punishment exceeding one year. All that a court
needs to do is impose punishment of greater than one year that is
conditional on an effectively unavoidable action. For instance, the court
could make any fraternization with gang members trigger a condition to
extend a punishment beyond a year, knowing that all prisons are rife with
gangs and contact with gangs is effectively unavoidable for inmates. Thus
if the logic that applies to supervised release is applied to punishments
more broadly, the courts will have gutted the Indictment Clause entirely.
Overall, the statutory authority for courts using parole revocation to
extend sentences beyond the legislative maximum is quite clear, but the
justifications given by the courts for why this practice does not violate the
Constitution are muddled. If either of the courts’ factual characterizations
of the relationship between parole revocation and initial sentences that are
used to justify why sentence extension does not violate the jury fact-finding
principle is accurate, then the practice must violate double jeopardy. The
courts’ way around this quandary, like their treatment of the Indictment
Clause difficulty, renders each of the relevant constitutional provisions
effectively nullified. Thus courts are continually recharacterizing the same
factual circumstances to avoid constitutional principles they have
developed in other contexts. Although some courts have acknowledged
these difficulties, more often courts have denied them, consistently
upholding and applying imposition of sentences beyond the statutory
maximum via parole revocation. Thus the most intuitive justification for
parole—that it reduces prison sentences—has been shown to be illusory.
162.
163.
164.

United States v. Purvis, 940 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1991).
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
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C. PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AT REVOCATION: THE STATE’S LOWERED
BURDEN
This section examines the jurisprudence of the parole revocation
hearing. The Supreme Court has justified limiting parolees’ due process
and Fifth Amendment rights as well as relaxing evidentiary rules during
these hearings on the basis that “revocation of parole is not part of a
criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in
such a proceeding does not apply.”165 The Court treats parole as a
“variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals”166 and because their
freedom is conditional, the Constitution gives states considerable flexibility
to structure these proceedings more informally than criminal trials.167 As
we discuss below, however, revocation hearings are often used in lieu of
criminal prosecutions when the parolee commits a new criminal offense.
To the extent that these proceedings are functioning as criminal trials, these
decreased procedural protections essentially allow the state to sentence
parolees to significant imprisonment without the constitutional protections
that have been deemed indispensable to the fairness and accuracy of
criminal trials.
1. Reduced Due Process Protections
The Supreme Court has held that the revocation of parole is not a part
of a criminal prosecution because “[r]evocation deprives an individual, not
of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the
conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole
restrictions.”168 Therefore, parolees have more limited due process rights
than defendants in criminal proceedings.169 These limited rights provide
prosecutors with many incentives to proceed by way of revocation rather
than a criminal trial. First, the standard of proof at a revocation hearing is a
preponderance of the evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.170 Additionally, because these proceedings are deemed more
informal than criminal trials, there are no “technical rules of procedure or
165. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).
166. Id. at 477. See also Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006) (“[P]arole is more akin to
imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment.”).
167. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998).
168. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480.
169. Id. (“[T]he full panoply of rights due a defendant in [a criminal prosecution] does not apply
to parole revocations.”); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789 (1973). While Gagnon is a probation
violation case, the U.S. Supreme Court treats parole and probation hearings identically. Id. at 782.
170. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012).
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evidence.”171 For instance, hearsay is often admissible.172 Finally, although
the hearing must be held before an independent party, that party “need not
be a judicial officer.”173 Taken together, when a parolee is engaged in
criminal conduct, it is far easier for the state to prove a parole violation
than it is to obtain a criminal conviction.
There is some minimal process to which parolees are constitutionally
due. They must be given written notice of the alleged violation174 and are
entitled to a preliminary hearing “as promptly as convenient after arrest” to
determine whether probable cause exists to believe they are in violation of
parole.175 If probable cause exists, they must be provided a final revocation
hearing within a reasonable time to determine whether a violation
occurred.176 One district court has held that parolees may be released on
bail pending this final hearing.177 Finally, at this hearing, they have the
right to be present, to introduce evidence,178 and a “conditional right” to
confront witnesses.179 However, these rights may have little practical effect
because the Court has also held that there is no guaranteed Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.180 Without the “guiding hand of counsel,”181
it is questionable that parolees will be able to represent themselves
effectively.
The reduced procedural rights of parolees is a cutting-edge
jurisprudential issue. The MacArthur Center for Justice at Northwestern
University School of Law brought two lawsuits, both subject to pending
consent decrees, in the district of Illinois challenging the failure of the
courts to recognize the need for these procedural protections. M.H. v.
Monreal182 and King v. Walker183 constitute class-action challenges to the
171. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786–87.
172. E.g., United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir. 2006).
173. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 486.
174. Id. at 489.
175. Id. at 485.
176. Id. at 488 (holding that conducting a final revocation hearing two months after the parolee
was arrested is not unreasonable).
177. United States v. Fernandez, 144 F. Supp. 2d 115, 118–19 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
178. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
179. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(2)(c) (“The
person [at a revocation hearing] is entitled to . . . an opportunity to appear, present evidence, and
question any adverse witness unless the court determines that the interest of justice does not require the
witness to appear . . . .”); Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 (describing limited right “to confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses”). This conditional right means that hearsay can be admissible.
180. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790.
181. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
182. M.H. v. Monreal, No. 1:12-CV-8523 (N.D. Ill. filed Oct. 23, 2012).
183. Amended Final Consent Decree, King v. Walker, No. 06-CV-204 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2014).
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failure to provide juveniles and adults, respectively, with procedural rights,
particularly: failure to provide notice and timely hearings, nonprovision of
counsel, failures in fact checking, and, in the case of juveniles, failure to
provide adult supervision during the process.
2. Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and Miranda
The Fifth Amendment gives individuals a right against being
“compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”184 This
right permits a defendant to refuse to answer questions “in any other
proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might
incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.”185 However, the Supreme
Court has held that parolees do not enjoy the same robust privilege.
Parolees can be required to truthfully answer their parole officer’s
questions as a condition of parole; and the refusal to answer, even if those
answers would be incriminating, can subject the parolee to revocation.186
Thus, although parolees have the theoretical right to refuse to answer a
parole officer’s incriminating questions, exercising that right subjects the
parolee to further imprisonment. Given that, as discussed in Part II.A, a
parolee can be incarcerated upon revocation for a period that cumulatively
exceeds the statutory maximum allowed for the crime that placed him on
parole in the first place, parolees face a heavy price for exercising their
right to remain silent.
The one benefit of the right against self-incrimination that parolees
retain is that their compelled statements cannot be used against them in a
criminal trial. Thus, if a parolee makes incriminating statements to his
parole officer and he can prove that those answers were compelled, then his
responses cannot be used against him in a criminal trial. In order to
demonstrate that his answers were compelled, however, the parolee must
show that his parole officer “either expressly or by implication, assert[ed]
that invocation of the privilege would lead to revocation of [parole].”187
The Court has interpreted this requirement very narrowly, and thus it is
uncertain if a parole condition requiring a parolee to answer his parole
officer’s questions truthfully would meet this burden.188 Furthermore, even
if the answers are compelled, those statements are admissible in the parole
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984).
Id. at 435.
Id. at 436–38.
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revocation hearing.189
In sum, parolees who are compelled to make incriminating statements
to their parole officers can have those statements used against them in a
parole revocation hearing. Furthermore, if they refuse to answer their
parole officers’ questions because their answers would incriminate them,
then they are subject to revocation of parole because their refusal to
truthfully answer questions posed by their parole officer is a violation of
their conditions of parole. Thus, parolees can find themselves in an
untenable position: either exercising their right or failing to exercise their
right can lead to imprisonment. Although their compelled statements
cannot be used against them in a criminal trial, parolees can still be
imprisoned for a significant amount of time as a result of revocation.
When it comes to the parolee’s rights to receive the warnings required
by Miranda v. Arizona,190 the Supreme Court has held that the typical
parole interview does not constitute “custody” despite the fact that parole
officers “could compel [a parolee’s] attendance and truthful answers.”191
This conclusion is justified because such seeming compulsion alone does
not “transform[] a routine interview into an inherently coercive setting.”192
Thus, these non-Mirandized statements can be used against the parolee in a
criminal case as well as in parole revocation hearings.193
In New York, statements taken in violation of Miranda are also
admissible in parole revocation hearings.194 However, the failure of parole
officers to inform a parolee of his Miranda rights may result in the
statements being suppressed in a criminal case. For instance, when a
parolee is represented by counsel in a criminal case, parole officers must
inform the parolee of his Miranda rights prior to questioning him about the
crime under indictment.195 Otherwise, any statements made to the parole
189. Id. at 435 n.7. See also Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(holding that revocation of supervised release based upon parolee’s refusal to answer questions relevant
to his status did not violate the Fifth Amendment in part because the officer did not impair the parolee’s
ability to invoke the privilege at any subsequent criminal proceeding).
190. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
191. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 431.
192. Id.
193. The Second Circuit has not addressed this question directly. The Fifth Circuit has held that
when statements are taken outside of the routine interview context and in violation of Miranda, they are
still admissible in parole revocation hearings because those hearings are administrative in nature.
United States v. Johnson, 455 F.2d 932, 933 (5th Cir. 1972).
194. See, e.g., People v. Ronald W., 249 N.E.2d 882, 883 (N.Y. 1969) (“[I]t is apparent that the
probation officers were not required to give [the probationer] the Miranda warnings before
[questioning] . . . .”).
195. People v. Parker, 442 N.Y.S.2d 803, 804 (App. Div. 1981).
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officer are inadmissible in the criminal case.196 Furthermore, if a parolee is
in custody, then Miranda warnings are required even if the parolee is not
represented by a lawyer in order for the statements to be used against him
in a criminal trial.197 However, when a parolee is neither in custody nor
represented by counsel, New York courts are split on the question of
whether parole officers must administer Miranda warnings in order for
those statements to be admissible in a criminal case.198
3. The Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule
The circuit courts are split on whether many Fourth Amendment rules
apply to parolees. For instance, there is division over whether the Fourth
Amendment’s oath and affirmation requirement applies to warrants issued
in response to alleged violations of community supervision. In the Ninth
Circuit, some violation warrants must be based on sworn facts,199 but the
First, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits do not require sworn facts for any violation
of an arrest warrant200 and the Eleventh Circuit rejects the oath requirement
for a violation summons.201 But one of the most central features of the
Fourth Amendment—the availability of the exclusionary rule to remedy
violations—was determined not to apply to parole revocation hearings by
the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v.
Scott.202 The Court’s reasoning in Scott rests on assumptions about the
operation of the parole revocation process that are inaccurate.
To begin with, the Court concluded that police officers are likely to be
unaware that the person searched is a parolee. Thus, because police officers
would be deterred by their knowledge that the exclusionary rule applies in
criminal trials, no additional deterrence was necessary.203 However, as we
examine in detail in Part III, police and parole officers often conduct joint
196. Id.
197. People v. English, 534 N.E.2d 1195, 1195 (N.Y. 1989).
198. See, e.g., People v. Vann, 879 N.Y.S.2d 654, 658–60 (App. Div. 2009) (discussing split in
the Appellate Divisions).
199. United States v. Murguia-Oliveros, 421 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3)) (“After the period of supervised release has expired . . . the district court can revoke the
term of supervised release only if a warrant based on sworn facts was issued within the supervised
release period.”); United States v. Vargas-Amaya, 389 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir. 2004).
200. United States v. Collazo-Castro, 660 F.3d 516, 523 (1st Cir. 2011). See also United States v.
Brennan, 285 F. App’x 51, 56 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished opinion) (stating that a limited warrant was
sufficient in the particular case); United States v. Garcia-Avalino, 444 F.3d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 2006)
(same). These circuits reject the Ninth Circuit’s position, disavowing the requirement that a violation
warrant, whether or not it extends the court’s jurisdiction, needs to be based on sworn facts.
201. United States v. Presley, 487 F.3d 1346, 1348–49 (11th Cir. 2007).
202. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998).
203. Id. at 367–68.
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searches of parolees, so there is every reason to assume that police officers
will be aware of an individual’s status, especially if the individual is a
person of interest that the police have been investigating. Furthermore, we
empirically establish in Part IV that in New York City police target
parolee-dense neighborhoods, and not simply because parolees tend to live
in high-crime neighborhoods. Thus our study brings into question the first
factual prong of Scott’s justification for the inapplicability of the
exclusionary rule in parole hearings.
Targeting parolee-dense neighborhoods makes sense, since lower
standards apply to searches of parolees. Parolees are easy targets for police
street patrols. If illegally seized evidence is admissible in parole revocation
hearings, police will have even stronger incentives to target parolees for
searches. Furthermore, since lower standards apply for parole revocation
proceedings than for initial criminal convictions, and parolees are subject to
significant prison time as a result of such revocations, the benefits of police
investigations of parolees are more certain than searches of others. All of
these rules together give officers strong incentives to target parolees for
searches.
The second spurious factual justification that the Scott Court used was
that deterring unlawful searches by parole officers was unnecessary
because parole officers “are not engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime”204 and have a “more supervisory than adversarial”
relationship with parolees.205 As will be discussed in Part III.A, while this
may have been true at the advent of the parole system, a number of changes
to parole since the 1970s make parole officers more like police officers.206
Furthermore, the number of cases in which parole and police officers
working together violate parolees’ Fourth Amendment rights belies this
claim.207
Additionally, proceeding with parole revocation “is often preferred to
a new prosecution because of the procedural ease of recommitting the
individual on the basis of a lesser showing by the State.”208 Indeed, the
exceptions to the ordinary criminal procedural protections described in this
204. Id. at 368 (quoting Untied States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984)).
205. Id. (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 879 (1987)).
206. See infra note 232 and accompanying text discussing mission creep.
207. See, e.g., Scott, 524 U.S. at 374–375 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that parole officers are
not “immune to [the] competitive zeal” of police officers); People v. Mackie, 430 N.Y.S.2d 733, 735
(App. Div. 1980) (citing cases) (finding that a parole officer “was merely a conduit for doing what the
police could not do otherwise” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
208. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972).
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section—significantly lowered burden of proof, relaxed evidentiary rules,
and discretionary confrontation rights—provide many reasons to proceed
by way of parole revocation instead of a criminal trial. In addition to all of
these effects, failing to provide the exclusionary rule as a remedy for
parolees at revocation hearings removes a potential deterrent to unlawful
police and parole officer conduct.209
When all of these various means of diluting parolees’ procedural
rights during the parole revocation process are taken together, those
proceedings begin to look more like traditional criminal trials, but without
the protections ordinarily associated with such serious proceedings.
Furthermore, since parolees can end up serving significant amounts of time
in prison for parole revocations, even beyond the statutory maximum for
the crime that led to them being placed on parole in the first place, a
prosecutorial goal of seeing a parolee incarcerated for a significant amount
of time may be better served by proceeding with a parole revocation
hearing instead of a criminal trial.
III. PAROLE SUPERVISION AND ITS RESULTING
VULNERABILITY
The goal of parole is “to help individuals reintegrate into society as
constructive individuals as soon as they are able, without being confined
for the full term of the sentence imposed.”210 However, as we demonstrate
in this part, parole has instead become a system that not only hinders
parolees’ successful reintegration but also makes them easy prey for those
who would take advantage of their diminished status. These perverse
effects are the result of a model of supervision that creates incentives to
revoke parole, even when the parolee is not engaged in criminal conduct,
and that strips parolees of procedural and constitutional protections, leaving
them with little recourse against violations of the rights they do possess.
Section A explains how the prevailing model of parole supervision can
undermine rehabilitation. Using New York as a case study, Section B
209. Scholars and judges alike are divided on whether the exclusionary rule provides genuine
protection in criminal trials. See Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 595 (2012) (explaining the failure of numerous empirical studies to answer
this question).
210. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 477. See also Caplan, supra note 3, at 33 (“The original intention of
parole supervision was not to revoke parole, but to constantly assess the parolees’ progress and to make
necessary changes.”); Angela D. West & Richard P. Seiter, Social Worker or Cop? Measuring the
Supervision Style of Probation and Parole Officers in Kentucky and Missouri, J. CRIME & JUST., no. 2,
2004, at 27, 29 (“Historically and almost exclusively until the late 1960s, probation and parole
supervision was focused on restoring offenders to the community.”).
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shows how police, criminals, and other community members are able to
gain significant leverage over parolees due to parolee vulnerability to
incarceration and an erosion of their constitutional and procedural rights.
Such leverage undermines parolees’ reintegration prospects and erodes
their rights even further.
A. PUNITIVE SURVEILLANCE
Originally, the goal of community supervision was to give parolees
the assistance they required to navigate their reentry into the community
successfully. The intent was not to revoke supervision but to constantly reevaluate their progress and to make adjustments as necessary to facilitate
their transition into the community.211 However, beginning in the 1970s
and continuing to the present, this rehabilitative approach to parole has
been replaced by a more surveillance-oriented model.212 Today, many
jurisdictions have intensive supervision programs (“ISPs”),213 a model
characterized by closer surveillance of parolees, with an emphasis on
finding violations, revoking parole, and returning them to custody.214 The
result is an increased number of revocations for minor technical violations,
placing parolees at constant risk of incarceration because the sheer number
of technical conditions makes it extremely difficult to avoid a violation.215
Even law abiding citizens would have difficulty complying with all the
211. Caplan, supra note 3, at 33.
212. Id. at 34 (noting that the “social casework approach, which emphasizes assisting parolees
with problems, counseling, and working to make sure they succeed,” has evolved and is now
surveillance-oriented, “emphasiz[ing] law enforcement and the close monitoring of parolees to catch
them if they fail and return them to prison”); James Bonta et al., Exploring the Black Box of Community
Supervision, 47 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 248, 248 (2008) (studying 62 probation officers and
finding that they “spent too much time on the enforcement aspect of supervision . . . and not enough
time on the service delivery role of supervision”); Scott-Hayward, supra note 40, at 438 (“[A]
surveillance or managerial model, dominated by a risk management philosophy has become more
common among supervision agencies.”); David M. Stout, Home Sweet Home?! Maybe Not for Parolees
and Probationers When It Comes to Fourth Amendment Protection, 95 KY. L.J. 811, 833 (2007)
(“Though the system’s stated purpose is a goal of rehabilitation, ‘[the] parole services are almost
entirely focused on control-oriented activities.’”); West & Seiter, supra note 210, at 29 (“Over the past
two decades . . . the trend has been an increasing reliance on close surveillance . . . . This style places an
emphasis on monitoring . . . compliance . . . and on the detection of violations leading to revocations
and returns to custody.”).
213. Joan Petersilia, A Decade of Experimenting with Intermediate Sanctions: What Have We
Learned?, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1998, at 3, 6.
214. West & Seiter, supra note 210, at 29.
215. Scott-Hayward, supra note 40, at 436 (“Given all the social, economic, and health deficits of
those coming out of prison, it becomes less than surprising that so many parolees are sent back to prison
for rule violations. When one combines these problems with conditions that are routinely set for
parole . . . a recipe for failure results.” (quoting MICHAEL JACOBSON, DOWNSIZING PRISONS: HOW TO
REDUCE CRIME AND END MASS INCARCERATION 150 (2005)).
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conditions imposed upon parolees. For example, parolees face the risk of
imprisonment for showing up late to or forgetting an appointment, or
getting home late because of unanticipated difficulties, such as a bus failing
to arrive, or deciding to spend the night at a girlfriend’s house instead of at
home.216 Unsurprisingly, then, it is difficult for parolees to successfully
complete community supervision without a single violation.217
Four factors account for this change in supervision style. First, there
has been a general rise in the punitiveness of the criminal justice system,
with a focus on retribution instead of rehabilitation.218 Second, parole
agencies worry that failing to revoke for minor violations would lead to
criticism, scrutiny, and a lawsuit should the parolee commit a more serious
crime later.219 Third, the exponential growth of community supervision
agencies’ caseloads220 without a concomitant rise in resources also
facilitates surveillance over rehabilitation.221 In New York, officers often
have caseloads with at least 200 serious offenders.222 With caseloads this
size, parole officers often lack sufficient time to engage in meaningful
rehabilitative efforts, such as helping parolees find counseling services or
employment.223 Even officers who might prefer a more individualized
rehabilitation approach are “force[d] . . . to adopt more surveillance-type
216. These technical violations can result in revocation of parole. See, e.g., Bolden v. Dennison,
814 N.Y.S.2d 477, 478 (App. Div. 2006) (finding that a parolee’s violation of his curfew constituted a
violation of a substantial condition of his parole); Shaw v. Murray, 808 N.Y.S.2d 844, 844 (App. Div.
2005) (quoting People ex rel. Walker v. Hammock, 435 N.Y.S.2d 410, 410 (App. Div. 1981))
(“[C]onduct of a parolee which is less than criminal conduct may result in a revocation of parole where
such conduct is proscribed by the conditions imposed by his parole.”).
217. For example, in a six-year study of fifteen youths in a Philadelphia neighborhood, only one
person out of fifteen successfully completed parole. Goffman, supra note 117, at 345.
218. Caplan, supra note 3, at 34; Scott-Hayward, supra note 40, at 439.
219. Richard P. Seiter, Prisoner Reentry and the Role of Parole Officers, FED. PROBATION, Dec.
2002, at 50, 51.
220. Caplan, supra note 3, at 34 (“In the 1970s, parole officers handled caseloads averaging 45
offenders; today it is up to 70 or more.”); Mark Jones & John J. Kerbs, Probation and Parole Officers
and Discretionary Decision-Making: Responses to Technical and Criminal Violations, FED.
PROBATION, June 2007, at 9, 11 (“[C]aseloads . . . contained an average of 141 offenders and a
maximum of 4000 offenders . . . .”); Scott-Hayward, supra note 40, at 438–39.
221. Caplan, supra note 3, at 34–35; West & Seiter, supra note 210, at 30.
222. Todd R. Clear & Edward J. Latessa, Probation Officers’ Roles in Intensive Supervision:
Surveillance Versus Treatment, 10 JUST. Q. 441, 443 (1993). A recent survey of parole officers in
Manhattan and the Bronx found that 84 percent had excessive caseloads. SCOTT M. STRINGER, OFFICE
OF THE MANHATTAN BOROUGH PRESIDENT, BREAKING PAROLE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEW YORK
STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE’S CASELOAD MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES, REENTRY NET 1 (Dec. 2006),
http://www.reentry.net/public2/library/attachment.92944. Furthermore, 87 percent of officers surveyed
characterized their own caseloads as “too high.” Id.
223. West & Seiter, supra note 210, at 30.
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activities to move offenders through the system.”224 Because of these
institutional constraints, parole officers function more as police officers
than social workers.225 In fact, these high caseloads can create incentives to
revoke parolees for technical violations, since revocation means fewer
cases.
The final reason for the move to a more punitive approach is the
growth of partnerships between parole agencies and the police.226 Parolepolice partnerships are being promoted by the Community Oriented
Policing Services (“COPS”) of the U.S. Department of Justice.227
According to COPS, key benefits of such partnerships include “intelligence
and information sharing”228 and “joint efforts in the discovery of criminal
activity.”229 These partnerships can also alleviate resource constraints
within parole offices since the police can help monitor parolees.230 In
jurisdictions that already have these partnerships, police and probation
officers participate in joint ride-alongs and home searches.231
However, these partnerships contribute to “mission creep,” whereby
parole officers focus on law enforcement objectives over their counseling
roles.232 As one police officer stated when asked to describe the benefits of
224. Id. at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Caplan, supra note 3, at 35 (finding that
although some officers think that rehabilitation functions are more effective, they use surveillance
instead because of management pressure to address the concerns of a more punitive public as well the
pressures of their caseloads).
225. Scott-Hayward, supra note 40, at 439 (“[P]arole officers look less like social workers and
more like police officers.”).
226. West & Seiter, supra note 210, at 30.
227. See, e.g., JESSE JANNETTA & PAMELA LACHMAN, CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS.,
PROMOTING PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN POLICE AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION: HOW COORDINATION
CAN REDUCE CRIME AND IMPROVE PUBLIC SAFETY 3 (2011), available at http://ric-zaiinc.com/Publications/cops-p203-pub.pdf (suggesting that supervision agencies can “enhance their role
in improving public safety” by working with law enforcement).
228. Id. at 4.
229. Id. at 6.
230. Id. at 23.
231. Id. at 10–11.
232. Ronald P. Corbett, Jr., Probation Blue? The Promise (and Perils) of Probation-Police
Partnerships, CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q., Summer 1998, at 31, 37–39 (noting that probation-police
partnerships can lead to mission creep, mission distortion, and organizational lag); David Murphy,
Police Probation Partnerships: Managing the Risks and Maximizing Benefits, JUST. POL’Y J., Spring
2008, at 1, 17 (noting that as a result of police partnerships, “officers reported feeling that they were
expected (by their law enforcement counterparts) to emphasize aggressive enforcement priorities at the
expense of their service and mentoring obligations”). See also Clear & Latessa, supra note 222, at 444
(“Most studies of roles in community supervision recognize two distinct functions: service delivery
(assistance) and law enforcement (control or surveillance).”); Bitna Kim et al., Predictors of Law
Enforcement Agencies’ Perceptions of Partnerships with Parole Agencies, 16 POLICE Q. 245, 249
(2013) (“[P]robation officers would lose sight of their service responsibilities by working with police to
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partnering with probation officers, “I think, just being able to access who
their offenders are and [find out] what their restrictions are. And then
having them as a tool to get into their houses that we wouldn’t otherwise be
able to access for people.”233
While reincarceration for new criminal offenses is to be expected, the
more punitive approach that is currently in vogue creates a revolving door
to prison even for technical violations, and that is problematic for a number
of reasons. First, reincarceration can stymie any progress towards
rehabilitation the parolee has already made. There is wide agreement that
stable housing234 and strong social relationships235 are important to
successful integration. Yet, arrests for technical violations can disrupt
relationships with family and friends as well as cause parolees to lose jobs
or educational opportunities, even if parolees are eventually reinstated to
supervision. In this way, the surveillance model hinders rehabilitation by
disrupting socialization back into the community. Second, arrests for
technical violations also adversely affect the parolee-parole officer
relationship, as parolees learn that parole officers are not there to help but
rather to police them in order to return them to custody. If parolees feel
constrained about sharing challenges they are experiencing with their
conduct heightened supervision of probationers.”); Bitna Kim, Jurg Gerber & Dan Richard Beto,
Listening to Law Enforcement Officers: The Promises and Problems of Police-Adult Probation
Partnerships, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 625, 627 (2010) (“The partnerships may become a source of incentives
for probation officers to gravitate toward a greater emphasis on the pursuit of law enforcement public
safety priorities at the expense of their responsibilities to serve as mentors, service brokers, agency
liaisons, and advocates for the offenders they supervise.”).
233. Murphy, supra note 232, at 18 (emphasis omitted). See also David Murphy & Faith Lutze,
Police-Probation Partnerships: Professional Identity and the Sharing of Coercive Power, 37 J. CRIM.
JUST. 65, 66 (2009) (noting that “if greater emphasis is placed on law enforcement objectives, [a]
partnership will primarily serve the interests of the police” rather than probation officers).
234. JANNETTA & LACHMAN, supra note 227, at 6 (“[P]arolees are more likely to be successful if
they can acquire stable housing and employment, abstain from drug and alcohol use, and engage in prosocial activities . . . .”). See also DEMELZA BAER ET AL., URBAN INST., UNDERSTANDING THE
CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY: RESEARCH FINDINGS FROM THE URBAN INSTITUTE’S PRISONER
REENTRY PORTFOLIO 4, 8, 11, 13 (2006), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/
411289_reentry_portfolio.pdf (concluding that stable housing is one of the most important components
of successful reentry).
235. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., PAROLE, DESISTANCE FROM CRIME,
AND COMMUNITY INTEGRATION 21 (2007) (noting that the “association of marriage with lower crime
among men has been widely reported in both quantitative and qualitative studies”); PETERSILIA, supra
note 42, at 41 (“Reviews of prisoners’ family relationships yield two consistent findings: male prisoners
who maintain strong family ties during imprisonment have higher rates of post-release success, and men
who assume husband and parenting roles upon release have higher rates of success than those who do
not.”); John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Understanding Desistance from Crime, 28 CRIME & JUST.
1, 13, 19–20 (2001) (noting that desistance from crime is influenced by a number of factors, the most
important of which appear to be strong social bonds including marriage, family ties, and employment).
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officers, then officers will not obtain the information necessary to get
parolees to treatment or to other programs that can aid in their reentry.
These consequences of ISPs may well be worth the price parolees pay
if it protects public safety by reducing recidivism. However, the evidence
points to the contrary. One study found that although the surveillance
model was effective in identifying parole violations, it did not reduce
recidivism.236 Parole officers report that the rehabilitation model was more
effective in providing assistance to parolees, while the surveillance
approach simply helps officers catch parolees engaged in technical
violations.237 Furthermore, a meta-analysis of existing studies found that
“control-oriented programs—those seeking to deter offenders through
surveillance and threats of punishment—were ineffective.”238 In fact,
“[e]xcept in a few instances, there is no evidence that these programs are
effective in reducing crime as measured by official record data.”239 Some
parole scholars conclude that ISPs produce “equal to or higher rates of
recidivism than regular probation or prison sentences.”240 Even some
proponents of ISPs acknowledge that “technical violations [are] a weak
predictor of future criminality.”241 Thus, while the control and surveillance
model of supervision is likely significantly responsible for the high rates of
revocation,242 “research repeatedly disproves that violating parolees for
technicalities reduces new criminal arrests. In fact, new criminal arrests
linked to former inmates constitute less than 3 percent of all arrests
nationwide.”243
Overall, the current supervision model increases the risk of
reincarceration and hinders progress towards successful socialization.
236. Caplan, supra note 3, at 34.
237. Richard P. Seiter & Angela D. West, Supervision Styles in Probation and Parole: An
Analysis of Activities, 38 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 57, 68–70, (2003).
238. Joan Petersilia, What Works in Prisoner Reentry? Reviewing and Questioning the Evidence,
FED. PROBATION, Sept. 2004, at 4, 6 (“[I]ncreased monitoring in the community (e.g., intensive
probation, electronic monitoring) did not alone reduce recidivism.”). See also Petersilia, supra note 213,
at 6 (finding that while parolees are “watched more closely, . . . ISP supervision did not decrease
subsequent arrests”).
239. Petersilia, supra note 213, at 6. See also West & Seiter, supra note 210, at 31 (citing a study
finding that increasing surveillance may not reduce recidivism).
240. Benjamin Steiner, Treatment Retention: A Theory of Post-Release Supervision for the
Substance Abusing Offender, FED. PROBATION, June 2004, at 24, 26.
241. Id.
242. West & Seiter, supra note 210, at 31.
243. Caplan, supra note 3, at 34 (citations omitted).
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B. LEVERAGE
In this subpart, we examine the impact of the punitive nature of parole
supervision, focusing in detail on New York City’s rules and their practical
effects. Since our empirical analysis is of stop and frisk practices in New
York City, a brief analysis of the rules of searches of parolees as applied in
New York City is appropriate. We expect variance in police-parolee
relations in different locations—for instance between cities and less
populous areas; however, New York only partially takes advantage of the
many means of leverage over parolees that we described in Parts I, II, and
III.A. For instance, it does not allow entirely suspicionless searches, even
though the U.S. Supreme Court has approved that practice. Parolees in
New York in fact have more rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures than parolees in other jurisdictions;244 yet we show that even so,
there are still many points of leverage available against parolees in New
York, which undermine the ultimate goals of parole. Thus, New York
constitutes a good vehicle for examining the impact of parole
jurisprudence.
244. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-640 (Supp. 2013) (“Before an inmate may be released on
parole, he must agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure, without a search warrant, with or
without cause, of the inmate’s person, any vehicle the inmate owns or is driving, and any of the
inmate’s possessions by: (1) any probation agent employed by the Department of Probation, Parole and
Pardon Services; or (2) any other law enforcement officer.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-301(1) (Supp.
2013) (“An inmate who is eligible for release on parole shall, as a condition of parole, sign an
agreement . . . that the inmate, while on parole, is subject to search or seizure of the inmate’s person,
property, place of temporary or permanent residence, vehicle, or personal effects while on parole: (a) by
a parole officer at any time, with or without a search warrant, and with or without cause; and (b) by a
law enforcement officer at any time, with or without a search warrant, and with or without cause . . . .”);
W. VA. CODE R. § 90-2-2(2.17) (2007) (“Parolees or probationers shall submit to a search without
warrant of his or her person, place of residency or motor vehicle by his or her parole officer for
supervision purposes at any time during the parole period.”). See also People v. McCullough, 6 P.3d
774, 781 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) (“[A] warrantless parole search is constitutional, even in the absence of
‘reasonable grounds,’ if the search meets the following requirements: (1) it is conducted pursuant to any
applicable statute; (2) it is conducted in furtherance of the purposes of parole, i.e., related to the
rehabilitation and supervision of the parolee; and (3) it is not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing.”); State
v. Devore, 2 P.3d 153, 156 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000) (quoting State v. Gawron, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297
(Idaho 1987)) (“The ‘reasonable grounds’ requirement for warrantless searches by probation or parole
officers does not apply when the subject of the search has entered into a probation or parole agreement
that includes a consent to warrantless searches.”); People v. Wilson, 885 N.E.2d 1033, 1043 (Ill. 2008)
(quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 857 (2006)) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.”); Robinson v. State, 312 So. 2d
15, 18 (Miss. 1975) (“[T]he parole authorities may subject [a parolee], his home and his effects, to
inspection and search as may seem advisable to them.”); State v. Zeta Chi Fraternity, 696 A.2d 530, 540
(N.H. 1997) (treating probation and parole as legally on par and concluding that warrantless probation
searches are permissible if they further the purposes of probation); State v. Turner, 297 S.W.3d 155,
157 (Tenn. 2009) (“[P]arolees who are subject to a warrantless search condition may be searched
without reasonable or individualized suspicion.”).
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1. Reduced Fourth Amendment Rights
Parolees in New York have a right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.245 Importantly, however, in determining
reasonableness, the individual’s status as a parolee is a relevant
consideration, and may in fact be determinative.246 Courts will “weigh the
interference . . . entail[ed] against the precipitating and attending
conditions, including a parolees’ diminished privacy expectations and the
conditional nature of parolees’ liberty.”247 As New York courts repeatedly
emphasize, “what may be unreasonable with respect to an individual who is
not on parole may be reasonable with respect to one who is.”248 Such a
position may be entirely reasonable, but we show that in combination with
other punitive parole conditions, such rules become counter-productive.
Parolees give consent to searches of their residence, person, and
property as a standard condition of release,249 although this consent only
applies to searches that are rationally and reasonably related to the duties of
the parole officer,250 which the burden is on the state to show.251
Furthermore, a parolee’s joint occupants who have equal authority to
control access to shared residences can consent to searches of jointly
occupied areas.252
Stops and frisks as well as searches conducted by a parolee’s own
parole officer are reasonable if the search is “rationally and reasonably
related to the performance of the parole officer’s duty,” including the
245. People v. Huntley, 371 N.E.2d 794, 796 (N.Y. 1977).
246. Id. at 797.
247. People v. Porter, 952 N.Y.S.2d 678, 681 (App. Div. 2012) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
248. Id. (quoting People v. Burry, 859 N.Y.S.2d 499, 501 (App. Div. 2008)). See also U.S. ex rel.
Santos v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 441 F.2d 1216, 1218 (2d Cir. 1971) (“A search which would be
unlawful if directed against an ordinary citizen may be proper if conducted against a parolee.”).
249. A parolee signs a consent form upon release which mandates that the parolee “will permit the
search and inspection of his person, residence and property.” N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9,
§ 8003.2(d) (2011).
250. Huntley, 371 N.E.2d at 796; People v. Tony, 914 N.Y.S.2d 585, 592 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
251. Tony, 914 N.Y.S.2d at 592. See also People v. Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d 575, 580 (N.Y. 1976)
(holding that consent must be voluntary and free from implicit or express coercion).
252. People v. Cosme, 397 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 (N.Y. 1979); People v. Miller, 572 N.Y.S.2d 149,
150–51 (App. Div. 1991); People v. Buggs, 528 N.Y.S.2d 659, 660 (App. Div. 1988). See also People
v. Lownes, 837 N.Y.S.2d 367, 368–69 (App. Div. 2007) (finding that a girlfriend living with a parolee
may also give consent to search their residence); People v. Carrington, 807 N.Y.S.2d 89, 90 (App. Div.
2006) (same); People v. Adams, 665 N.Y.S.2d 991, 992–93 (App. Div. 1997) (citing United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169 (1974)) (finding that a search of a parolee’s bedroom in his father’s house
was reasonable based upon the father’s consent when the father was a “joint occupant” and the space
searched was “jointly occupied”).
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officer’s duties to reintegrate the parolee into society, prevent parole
violations, and detect and prevent crimes.253 New York police officers do
not have the same latitude: searches by police officers must meet the
traditional standards of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, as the case
may be, although the parolee’s status is relevant to the reasonableness
determination.254 We show below that the reality can be more permissive
than is required by law.
Additionally, if a police officer is working with parole officers, the
standard for stopping and frisking a parolee is even lower than the
reasonable suspicion standard. When working together, the more
permissive parole officer standard applies as long as the parole officer is
investigating a parole violation.255 Even when the parole officer is not
present, a police officer acting under the “fellow officer rule” may frisk a
parolee without reasonable suspicion if a parole officer directs the police
officer to do so and the purpose of the frisk is “rationally and reasonably”
related to the parole officer’s duty.256
As a result of the greater latitude parole officers have to conduct
searches, courts will carefully scrutinize the parole officer’s role in
searches involving both parole and police officers.257 In joint searches, if
parole officers are simply acting as agents of the police, the search is
unreasonable unless probable cause or reasonable suspicion exists.258 But
253. Huntley, 371 N.E.2d at 797. See also People v. Driscoll, 957 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477 (App. Div.
2012) (addressing stops and frisks); People v. LaFontant, 847 N.Y.S.2d 650, 651 (App. Div. 2007)
(holding that a search of a parolee’s cell phone by a parole officer was unreasonable because it was not
rationally and reasonably related to the parole officer’s duties).
254. People v. Carney, 444 N.E.2d 26, 27 (N.Y. 1982) (stating that officer must have knowledge
of some fact or circumstance that suggests the suspect is armed or poses a threat to safety for
authorization to frisk); People v. Caicedo, 893 N.Y.S.2d 609, 609 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting People v.
Batista, 672 N.E.2d 581, 583 (N.Y. 1996)) (holding that to conduct a protective pat frisk, an officer
“must have knowledge of some fact or circumstance that supports a reasonable suspicion that the
suspect is armed or poses a threat to safety”).
255. Carrington, 807 N.Y.S.2d at 90 (“Although the parole officers were cooperating with the
police, who were investigating a homicide, the record fails to support defendant’s assertion that the
parole officers were acting solely on behalf of the police.”).
256. People v. Porter, 952 N.Y.S.2d 678, 682 (App. Div. 2012) (holding that a parole officer
directing police to search was reasonable after receiving a confidential informant tip that a parolee was
carrying a gun and was out past his curfew). But see Driscoll, 957 N.Y.S.2d at 477 (stating that a police
officer frisk of a parolee was unsupported by reasonable suspicion).
257. People v. Peterson, 777 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49 (App. Div. 2004); People v. Felder, 708 N.Y.S.2d
774, 775 (App. Div. 2000); People v. Candelaria, 406 N.Y.S.2d 783, 786 (App. Div. 1978).
258. Candelaria, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 786. See also Huntley, 371 N.E.2d at 797 (holding that looking
for evidence for not reporting to a meeting when a parolee did not appear unable to leave his home was
reasonable); People v. Lloyd, 951 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640 (App. Div. 2012) (holding that looking for a
parolee whose ankle bracelet had stopped transmitting a signal was reasonable); People v. Johnson, 942
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otherwise the search will be reasonable, even if police are present, as long
as the search is rationally and reasonably related to the parole officer’s
duties.259
For instance, in People v. Taylor, police suspected Taylor, a parolee,
of involvement in a robbery.260 The officers called Taylor’s parole officer
in order to obtain his address. However, they did not disclose their
suspicions.261 During their conversation, the parole officer informed the
police that he was going to Taylor’s residence to check compliance with a
10 p.m. curfew and asked the officers to accompany him.262 Upon finding
that Taylor was not at home, it was clear that Taylor was in violation of his
mandated curfew. As a result, the parole officer conducted a search of the
residence in order to find information about his whereabouts. During the
search, Taylor called and made incriminating statements. At his subsequent
trial on robbery charges, Taylor sought to have his statements suppressed
as the fruit of an unlawful search.263 He argued that the “police officers
illegally and improperly bypassed the requirement of obtaining a valid
search warrant by masking the visit [to his] residence and search of his
room as a parole visit.”264 The court held that his statements were
admissible because the initial trip to Taylor’s residence was to “pursu[e]
parole-related objectives,” and although police officers were present, the
search was reasonably and rationally related to the parole officer’s
duties.265
Although parolees have a right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures, whether the exclusionary rule applies to parole revocation
proceedings in New York is an open question. In People ex rel. Piccarillo
v. New York State Board of Parole,266 the New York Court of Appeals held
that the exclusionary remedy applies to all illegally obtained evidence
during the parole revocation process. However, subsequent to that decision,
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Pennsylvania Board of Probation &
N.Y.S.2d 738 (App. Div. 2012) (holding that unlocking and searching a parolee’s car and finding
contraband in the console was reasonable when independently justified by a parole officer).
259. Carrington, 807 N.Y.S.2d at 89 (“Although the parole officers were cooperating with the
police, who were investigating a homicide, the record fails to support defendant’s assertion that the
parole officers were acting solely on behalf of the police.”); People v. Lopez, 733 N.Y.S.2d 154, 154
(App. Div. 2001); Felder, 708 N.Y.S.2d at 775.
260. People v. Taylor, 947 N.Y.S.2d 871, 872 (App. Div. 2012).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 872–73.
263. Id. at 873.
264. Id. at 872 (internal quotation marks omitted).
265. Id. at 873.
266. People ex rel. Piccarillo v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 397 N.E.2d 354, 358 (N.Y. 1979).
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Parole v. Scott, which held that the exclusionary rule was not
constitutionally mandated in parole hearings.267 Since Scott, the lower New
York courts are split on the issue of whether Piccarillo is still good law. At
least two trial courts have interpreted Piccarillo to hold that the
exclusionary rule in parole revocation hearings is a state constitutional right
and thus is still applicable post-Scott.268 However, at least one trial court
has held that Piccarillo did not create a right to the exclusionary rule under
the state constitution.269
Even if the exclusionary rule does apply, it is well established that
there are many ways around that constraint.270 Illegally garnered evidence
can nonetheless be used to prosecute third parties who lack standing to
exclude, to impeach a defendant’s or witness’s credibility, to prosecute
noncriminal cases, to find other evidence,271 to recover contraband, to
harass a suspect, or to induce a subject to become a police informant.272
This is even more strongly the case for searches of parolees because parole
revocation hearings are administrative proceedings273 and administrative
hearing officers have no authority to rule on constitutional issues.274 Thus,
unless there has been a “prior judicial determination that evidence
presented at a preliminary parole revocation hearing has been illegally
obtained, a Hearing Officer may consider that evidence on the issue of
probable cause.”275 Additionally, a “subsequent judicial determination
267. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998).
268. People ex rel. Taylor v. Warden, No. 260531-2011, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6165, at *6
(Sup. Ct. Dec. 23, 2011) (unpublished decision); State ex rel. Thompson v. Harder, 799 N.Y.S.2d 353,
355 n.2 (Sup. Ct. 2005).
269. People ex rel. Gordon v. O’Flynn, 775 N.Y.S.2d 507, 513–14 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
270. See Jacobi, supra note 209, at 597 (describing the manifold benefits of conducting searches
even if the results of those searches are excluded at trial).
271. Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV.
665, 734–35 (1970).
272. Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1365, 1370–71 (2008).
273. People ex rel. Maiello v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 480 N.E.2d 356, 357 (N.Y. 1985); People
ex rel. Piccarillo v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 397 N.E.2d 354, 356 (N.Y. 1979).
274. People ex rel. Zeigler v. Warden, 562 N.Y.S.2d 677, 678 (App. Div. 1990) (“[T]he proper
forum for petitioner to challenge seizure of the physical evidence was in a suppression court, rather than
before the Division of Parole.”); Tejada v. Christian, 422 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (App. Div. 1979) (holding
that a housing authority hearing officer correctly ruled that he had no authority to rule on a
constitutional issue related to allegations of an illegal search and seizure).
275. People ex rel. Victory v. Travis, 734 N.Y.S.2d 749, 751 (App. Div. 2001). However, a
parolee must be given the opportunity to litigate suppression issues. Id. If the parolee does not have a
pending criminal case, he or she can bring a habeas corpus proceeding for a determination of whether
evidence was illegally seized. People ex rel. Coldwell v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 506 N.Y.S.2d 761,
763 (App. Div. 1986) (holding that a lower court erred in failing to hold a hearing on a parolee’s habeas
proceeding made during the pendency of his preliminary hearing). If the parolee has a pending criminal
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suppressing that evidence does not undermine the validity of the probable
cause determination” because “evidence that has not been suppressed may
supply the basis for a probable cause determination at a preliminary parole
revocation hearing.”276 Once probable cause is found, the parolee must
remain in custody pending his final revocation hearing.
2. Vulnerability to Manipulation
The ease with which parolees can lose their conditional freedom and
the minimal procedural and substantive protections available to them gives
others considerable leverage over them. A phone call to a parole officer
reporting that a parolee has violated his curfew or was drinking alcohol in
his home can be sufficient reason for parole officers to conduct a
warrantless search of the parolee’s home without probable cause or to
conduct a stop and frisk on the street without reasonable suspicion.
Police may even be asked to accompany the parole officer’s search, in
which case the lower standard also covers their actions. NYPD officers
sometimes use partnerships with parole officers to essentially commandeer
joint home searches.277 The cover of parole officers’ broader search
entitlements is exploited by police to conduct otherwise illegal searches,
harass parolees, and expand searches beyond the parolee and areas within
his control,278 a practice known as the “stalking horse.”279 While New York
state courts have suppressed evidence in criminal prosecutions as a result of
these types of searches,280 the Second Circuit has rejected “stalking horse”
challenges to joint searches conducted without a warrant.281
case based on the same facts underlying the alleged parole violation, he or she can ask for an
adjournment of the parole hearing in order to litigate the suppression issue there. Glenn v. O’Meara,
No. 139429, 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5832, at *9 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 20, 2012) (unpublished decision)
(“Where a criminal action is pending with respect to the same conduct underlying the parole revocation
proceedings, suppression issues can be addressed in criminal court.”).
276. Travis, 734 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
277. Kit R. Roane, Use of Police in Parole Raids Stirs Praise, but Also Concern, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 12, 1999, at A1.
278. Id.
279. William D. Burrell, Getting the Most Out of Probation/Parole-Police Partnerships,
COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS REP., Nov./Dec. 1999, at 1, 2.
280. See, e.g., People v. Mackie, 430 N.Y.S.2d 733, 735 (App. Div. 1980) (finding that “[t]here
was no satisfactory explanation for [the] presence” of police officers during a parole officer’s visit to a
parolee’s apartment).
281. In the Second Circuit, it is irrelevant whether police officers are “using” parole officers’
broader search entitlements simply to gather criminal evidence. United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446,
463 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that when a probation officer enters a residence based upon information
that the parolee is engaged in illegal activity, “it is difficult to imagine a situation where [he] . . . would
not be pursuing legitimate supervised release objectives,” even if accompanied by the police). The same
rule applies to state parole officers. United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 667 (2d Cir. 2004). Thus,
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There is reason to believe that the lower standard will be applied in
New York with some frequency because the NYPD and the New York
Division of Parole participate in joint task forces to locate and arrest people
who have absconded from parole.282 Additionally, the Parole Division has a
policy requiring their officers to be accompanied by at least two police
officers for any home visit occurring after 10 p.m.283 Police and parole
agencies also contribute to and share a criminal justice database284 and
participate in joint ride-alongs.285 More informally, case law references
police and parole officer cooperation even in the absence of an official
policy or partnership.286
Additionally, officers can use the threat of arrest to coerce parolees
into acting as informants. Acting as a criminal informant is not only
dangerous—it also places parolees in contact with criminals, thereby
increasing their risk of reoffending.287 Furthermore, being in proximity to
known criminals can violate a condition of their parole. Yet, this double
bind may be difficult for parolees to avoid.
In addition to enabling police and parole officer intrusions on
parolees’ privacy, these reduced rights against the state also make parolees
vulnerable to victimization by private individuals, who can prey on their
diminished legal status. For instance, a mugger with awareness that a
parolee is out past curfew can easily rob him, knowing that the parolee is
unlikely to report the incident to his parole officer or the police.288
Additionally, gang members and other criminals can blackmail parolees
into criminal activity by threatening to call their parole officer or the police
with a tip, whether true or not, that the parolee is engaged in criminal
activity or violating some other condition of parole.
there is every incentive for the police to conduct searches with parole officers in order to avoid the
probable cause, warrant, and reasonable suspicion requirements.
282. See, e.g., People v. Van Buren, 604 N.Y.S.2d 188, 189 (App. Div. 1993) (referencing NYPD
officer assigned to the Warrant Division of the Parole Task Force); People v. Fields, 756 N.Y.S.2d 399,
401 n.1 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (referencing a joint task force between the NYPD and the New York Division
of Parole).
283. People v. Taylor, 947 N.Y.S.2d 871, 872 (App. Div. 2012) (referencing this policy).
284. JANNETTA & LACHMAN, supra note 227, at 25.
285. Interview by David M. Allen with Mary Kopp, Parole Officer, N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. &
Supervision (July 10, 2013).
286. State v. Harder, 799 N.Y.S.2d 353, 355 n.2 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (referencing police and parole
officers conducting a joint operation).
287. JANNETTA & LACHMAN, supra note 227, at 27 (noting that while “[p]olice may
want . . . parolees to aid their investigative work by acting as criminal informants,” doing so “could
require interacting with criminals and might ultimately put supervisees at risk for reoffending”).
288. Goffman, supra note 117, at 345 (describing an incident in which a parolee feared going to
the hospital after being severely beaten).

2014]

THE ATTRITION OF RIGHTS UNDER PAROLE

939

Studies have shown that even family and friends use parolee status as
a form of leverage over the parolee. Sociologist Alice Goffman, who
conducted a six-year study of a group of African American men in a
Philadelphia neighborhood, found that friends and family would often use
the threat of reporting real or false violations to parole officers as a means
of coercion and social control.289 In fact, one parole officer related that “the
most common way he learned about rule violations was from offenders’
‘girlfriends, ex-girlfriends, family, [or] friends.’”290 This, of course,
undermines the very social networks that are critical to rehabilitation.
The point of this discussion is not that members of the community
should be discouraged from reporting parolees’ violations of conditions;
rather, it is that the punitive nature of the parole system makes parolees so
attuned to the threat of revocation that it can make them vulnerable to
manipulation in ways that undermine their prospects for rehabilitation.
Police and criminals alike can use parole violations, real or fictitious, as
leverage to coerce parolees into acting as informants or engaging in
criminal activities, since, once a parolee is arrested on a violation, he or she
will remain in custody for at least fifteen and up to 105 days before a
hearing officer will adjudicate the merits of the alleged violation.
Even if the parolee is eventually restored to supervision, any job or
educational opportunities he or she had will likely have been lost while he
or she languished in jail. We have illustrated this effect by examining New
York, a state that does not even fully exploit the latitude given to it by the
Supreme Court. “[T]he threat of imprisonment transforms social relations
by undermining already tenuous attachments to family, work, and
community[,]” and it allows people in the community to “exploit
[parolees’] wanted status as an instrument of social control.”291 In this way,
parolees’ reduced rights breed even fewer rights. For all of these reasons,
the current system of parole, which is meant to facilitate a parolee’s
successful reentry into the community, has the perverse effect of achieving
the opposite.
3. Targeting Parolees for Stops and Frisks
Police officers have more latitude to stop and frisk parolees than
ordinary citizens because a parolee’s status is relevant to the
reasonableness determination. This suggests that officers will subject
289.
290.
291.

Id. at 348–49.
Klingele, supra note 46, at 1037 n.111.
Goffman, supra note 117, at 339.

940

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:887

parolees to more aggressive policing tactics. Typically, officers’
performance evaluations and promotions are tied to the number of arrests
they make.292 To the extent that rank and file officers want to move up the
chain of command, this merit system provides them with incentives to
focus stops and frisks in neighborhoods where they believe they will
achieve the greatest number of arrests at the lowest cost.293 This makes
neighborhoods with high concentrations of parolees extremely attractive.
More permissive reasonableness standards governing police
interactions with parolees make it easier to justify stops and frisks. For
instance, parolees tend to live in high-crime neighborhoods, a factor
officers often utilize to explain why they considered an individual’s
otherwise innocent behavior suspicious.294 While courts have sometimes
rejected this as the sole basis for stopping and frisking ordinary citizens, it
may be sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion if parolees are the
targets, given their diminished expectations of privacy.295 This reasoning
similarly applies to other criteria officers rely on to justify their stops and
frisks, such as a suspect’s association with known criminals. As such, not
only might the threshold for searching parolees be lower than for ordinary
citizens, but also establishing reasonableness is easier for the police when
the frisk concerns parolees.
Parolees often live in neighborhoods with large concentrations of
292. See, e.g., The War on Marijuana in Black and White, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION 98–104
(June 2013), http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/061413-mj-report-rfs-rel5.pdf (noting the use of arrests as
performance measures and incentives to obtain federal grants). This form of accountability is largely an
outgrowth of Compstat, a program developed in New York that allows departments to gather crime
statistics in order to “identify emerging problems[,] to coordinate effective deployment of resources
[, and] to increase accountability.” Compstat: Its Origins, Evolution, and Future in Law Enforcement
Agencies, BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE 4, 8 (2013), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PERFCompstat.pdf. As Wesley Skogan notes, Compstat “focuses on traditional measures” of performance,
including the number of arrests made. Wesley G. Skogan, Why Reforms Fail, in POLICE REFORM FROM
THE BOTTOM UP: OFFICERS AND THEIR UNIONS AS AGENTS OF CHANGE 144, 151 (Monique Marks &
David Sklansky eds., 2012).
293. JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE
OF FORCE 189–190 (1993) (“[O]bjectification and quantification of police work . . . trickles down to the
department’s lowest level, its patrol cars and foot beats. When that occurs, everybody up and down the
line becomes driven by the need to generate what New York cops used to call ‘big numbers.’”).
294. See infra Part IV.
295. See, e.g., People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562, 570 (N.Y. 1976) (holding that acts were
sufficient to justify officers’ suspicions in part because it was late at night in a high-crime area); People
v. Howard, 542 N.Y.S.2d 536, 540 (App. Div. 1989) (noting that the high-crime factor alone “cannot
serve as the justification for untoward or excessive police behavior,” but that it can be considered “in
combination with objective factors specific to the incident which together support a founded suspicion
that some particular criminal activity may be afoot”); People v. Cornelius, 497 N.Y.S.2d 16, 19 (App.
Div. 1986) (noting the high-crime nature of the area in determining that a stop and frisk was justified).
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convicts and criminals,296 making it even easier for officers to stop and
frisk parolees. Because open-air drug markets and gang violence are often
rampant in such neighborhoods, it is easy for a parolee to inadvertently be
in the vicinity of a drug deal or violence. Thus, simply walking around their
own neighborhood may give officers reason to stop parolees for
questioning. Even if parolees make efforts to avoid criminals and other
parolees in their midst, these efforts may themselves be used as evidence of
suspicious activity justifying a stop: walking down deserted streets, looking
around before entering a building, and remaining in a vehicle until
ascertaining the coast is clear are all behaviors cited by NYPD officers as
suspicious activity warranting a stop and frisk.297
Moreover, a standard condition of parole in New York and many other
states prohibits parolees from associating with anyone who has a criminal
record. Officers are likely aware of this condition as a result of working
closely with parole officers. Hence, parolees are constantly at risk of
violating or being accused of violating this condition of parole simply by
virtue of where they live. Police can not only use this parole condition as a
basis for stopping and questioning a parolee, but also they can threaten to
make a phone call to the parole officer to report a suspected violation. This
can then provide the basis for the issuance of a parole warrant.
Another factor that may result in parolees being stopped and frisked
more often than ordinary citizens is that being a person with “dangerous
propensities” can be sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.298 Officers
have multiple ways of becoming aware of a parolee’s criminal history.299 If
officers know that a parolee was previously convicted of an assault or some
other violent offense, this can support an inference that he or she poses a
296. See infra Part IV, Maps A–D (showing the strong coincidence between parolee-dense
neighborhoods and police stops).
297. Howard, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 536–40 (noting that officers approached individual for more
investigation when, among other things, they observed the individual standing on a street corner near a
subway entrance for two to three minutes, looking up and down the street and subway stairs);
Cornelius, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 17–20 (noting that officers justified a stop in part because they saw the
defendant walking, stopping, and looking around at 10 p.m. wearing a “ragged and old” trench coat);
People v. Williams, 436 N.Y.S.2d 15, 17 (App. Div. 1981) (discussing an anticrime unit whose officers
decided “to check their license and registration, things like that” after observing three men talking to
each other in a vehicle for about fifteen minutes while looking at the front door of a building).
298. People v. Chinchillo, 509 N.Y.S.2d 153, 155 (App. Div. 1986) (discussing “dangerous
propensities attributable to [defendant]” as part of reasonableness analysis).
299. In New York, police and parole agencies both contribute to and share a criminal justice
database. JANNETTA & LACHMAN, supra note 227, at 25. See also supra note 282 and accompanying
text (discussing joint task forces). Additionally, police officers can become aware of the parolee’s
criminal history through the joint parole-police task forces and through their previous interactions with
parolees.
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danger to officer safety and should be frisked.
Officers may also use aggressive stops and frisks in areas with large
numbers of parolees in order to drive them out of the neighborhood.300
Parolees have little recourse against such activities. While they could in
theory bring a civil rights damages action pursuant to § 1983 in Title 42 of
the United States Code, these claims provide little hope for relief because
of qualified immunity and a host of other problems.301 Additionally,
parolees who are harassed by the police have much to lose if they complain
or report the misconduct because if they are arrested in retaliation, they can
spend a considerable amount of time in custody before a final revocation
hearing is held.
In sum, parolees make attractive targets for police officers motivated
to bolster their arrest statistics. Since parolees have only limited rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures, police may err on the side of
conducting a frisk or search rather than forego the opportunity to find
criminal evidence. Furthermore, as we showed in previous sections, a
parolee’s reduced procedural and substantive rights mean that officers can
violate the few privacy protections parolees do possess with impunity.
Even if police conduct an unlawful search or seizure, illegally seized
evidence can be considered in determining whether the parolee violated
any condition of parole. Thus, the myriad conditions to which parolees are
subject, coupled with their reduced procedural and substantive rights, have
the effect of decreasing their rights even further. The next part tests
whether these effects occur systematically.
IV. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF PAROLE ON THE
INDIVIDUAL AND THE COMMUNITY: NEW YORK CITY POLICE
STOPS, FRISKS, SEARCHES, AND ARRESTS
This part reports our empirical study of the relationship between living
in a neighborhood with a high density of parolees and the frequency of both
police stops and police action taken after stopping an individual—
conducting frisks, searches, and arrests. We show that not only are
individual parolees subject to significantly more stops, searches, and
300. Kim, Gerber & Beto, supra note 232, at 631 (noting that “mission distortion” caused by
partnerships can “make it easier for police to abuse their power and engage in behaviors such as
harassing probationers in an attempt to drive them out of particular neighborhoods”).
301. For a general discussion of the barriers posed by § 1983 litigation, see Barbara E. Armacost,
Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 467 (2004) and Dasha
Kabakova, Note, The Lack of Accountability for the New York Police Department’s Investigative Stops,
10 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 539, 551–55 (2012).
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arrests, but so are nonparolees living in neighborhoods with high numbers
of parolees. This hazard is not simply a product of being a high-crime area;
if that were the case, we would see increases in all four categories of
outcomes. The reduced rights of parolees created by Samson and other like
rules enable police to search parolees with lower standards of suspicion;
consequently, they can often undertake searches without first using frisks to
establish probable cause for a search. Consistent with this, our results show
that frisks are significantly decreased in parolee-dense neighborhoods,
while stops, searches, and arrests are significantly increased.
A. ORIGINAL DATA DESCRIPTION
In order to analyze the effect of parole on both individual and
community constitutional criminal rights, we created two new databases:
one that examines the effect of parole on the probability of being stopped
by the police, and another that examines the effect of parole on the
probability, once stopped, of being frisked, searched, and arrested.
Both of our databases use New York City police statistics. New York
City was recently found liable in the first of three class actions challenging
the constitutionality of the nonrandom nature of police stops, frisks,
searches, and arrests. The order was subsequently blocked, and the legal
case was settled, with an agreement that a court-appointed monitor would
oversee reform of the NYPD’s stop and frisk program. Our analysis adds
insight to that controversy. That litigation concerned racial profiling, but
our analysis shows that, even controlling for race at both the individual and
the community levels, police targeting of individuals for Terry stops is
correlated with the density of the parolee population. Racial differences are
only one mechanism by which police are selecting individuals for stops;
parole is another such targeting factor. Consequently, our data confirms the
suspicion raised by our preceding doctrinal analysis that parole
jurisprudence has had a significant adverse effect on individual and
community rights.
Our database concerning the probability of being frisked, searched,
and arrested uses data from previous racial profiling studies and expands on
it to include parolee density statistics. This database is rich in information,
comprising over 678,000 observations of police stops of individuals in
2011. The Appendix provides a copy of the form the NYPD used to collate
the data. The data has over 100 variables, including: the sex, race, and age
of the individual stopped by the police; the location where the stop
occurred; and information about the nature of the stop. The data includes
the reason why a stop was initiated, the procedure followed during the stop
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(such as whether force was used), and the outcome of the stop (such as
what was found during a search). Consequently, we are able to consider
and control for a large number of factors that could potentially affect the
relationship between police stops and parolee density.
One limitation of this frisk, search, and arrest data is that it selects on
the dependent variable—it shows only what happens when a stop occurs.
As such, it is possible to examine the race, gender, and income of only
those stopped. Thus, this data cannot answer the preliminary question of
why any person is stopped in the first place, since it has no information on
who is not stopped. However, our second database provides an opportunity
to address this question. We have combined data about New York City
police stops per zip code302 and the number of parolees per zip code,303
allowing us to analyze the relationship between the two. Thus, in
combination, our two databases allow us to analyze who is stopped and
what happens once they are stopped.
There were two practical complications in creating these databases—
one geographic and one temporal. The raw parolee data was at the zip code
level, whereas the raw stop data was at the individual level. Nonetheless,
we were able to translate the data into comparable geographic units. The
stop data contains X and Y coordinates under the State Plane Coordinate
System, which is akin but not identical to the latitude and longitude
coordinate system. Next, we converted the parolee data available at the zip
code level into the State Plane System.304 We then performed a Spatial Join
to convert both sets of data into zip codes.305 This allowed us to answer our
preliminary question of who is stopped by comparing police stop data with
parolee data.
The temporal complication was that the parolee data is the number of
parolees living in a zip code as of December 15, 2008, whereas the police
302. Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-andfrisk-data (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
303. Data, JUST. ATLAS SENT’G & CORRECTIONS, http://www.justiceatlas.org (last visited Mar.
14, 2014).
304. It was originally in a projected Coordinate System called NAD_1983_UTM_Zone_18N. We
converted the projection of the zip codes into the State Plane coordinate system using the Projection
tool in ArcGIS 10. We very gratefully acknowledge the invaluable aid of David Chan for his help in
automating and executing this conversion process.
305. A Spatial Join uses a common key between the two sets of information to combine them; the
“key” is based on a spatial location where the points fall within the zip code. To see an example, visit
http://i.imgur.com/t1f4fqu.jpg. Basically, the spatial join pulls the information from the zip code
outlines into each of the stop and frisk points. Again, thanks to David Chan for writing a program that
automated this process, and thus making it practical to undertake for 600,000 observations.
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stop, frisk, search, and arrest data is for the year 2011. There are a number
of reasons to be reassured that our results are valid despite this time
difference. First, empirically, as becomes apparent in the discussion of
Figure 3 below, there is a high level of congregation of where parolees live,
and so there is good reason to expect that the parolee data would not
change drastically from year to year. Second, theoretically, it makes good
sense to compare parolee data from at least a slightly earlier date than the
stop data, since police officers’ impressions of the demographic
characteristics of a neighborhood would presumably be based on how that
neighborhood was in the recent past, rather than how the neighborhood is at
that precise moment. Even if parolee density data does change, police
perceptions are likely to lag, so our results should be reliable despite the
time shift. Finally, to the extent that there is more of a lag in our data than
in the police targeting process, this complication should make finding any
result more difficult, and so it does not undermine our results.
We first address the preliminary question of who is stopped, using
what we call the “Stop Data.” We then address the secondary question of
what occurs after the stop is made, using what we call the “Frisk, Search,
and Arrest Data.”
1. Descriptive Statistics: Stop Data
Table 1 provides a summary of our first database, the Stop Data. The
first two variables, “parolees” and “stops,” are the rates of parolees and the
rates of stops for each zip code. We hypothesize that parolee density and
stop frequency will be positively related—our theory is that police target
high parolee neighborhoods for Terry stops.
It is apparent from the summary information that the incidence of both
parolees and police stops varies considerably between zip codes—the
standard deviation for each is greater than their respective means. For all of
the variables, the minimum is zero. Perhaps unsurprisingly, some zip codes
in the city have no resident parolees, and some have no incidence of police
stops. The zip code with the highest density had 540 parolees, and the most
targeted zip code had tens of thousands of stops. Clearly neither variable is
distributed randomly.
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TABLE 1. Stop Data
Mean

Standard
Deviation

Median

Maximum

86.72

110.66

39.00

540.00

3,476.00

3,859.98

2,178.00

22,647.00

Parolees
Stops
Parolee per capita

0.0018

0.0022

0.0012

0.0163

Stops per capita

0.0758

0.0723

0.0532

0.6205

Fraction non-white
or Hispanic

0.63

0.30

0.61

1.00

Fraction household
income <$25,000

0.27

0.15

0.26

0.63

Fraction singleparent household

0.20

0.13

0.16

0.48

Number of zip codes: 188

By dividing the data by population, we are able to analyze the
relationship between the number of parolees per capita in a particular area
and the number of police stops per capita in that area—our third and fourth
variables. Thus, we have both the “parolee count” and the “parolee rate” in
the zip codes of New York City. When we conduct our regressions, we
provide one model using parolee counts and controlling for population, and
another model normalizing by population (dividing each variable by the
population of the zip code). Actual parolee and stop rates are easy to
interpret, but parolee per capita and stops per capita are advantageous
because they control for population variance more directly. As such, we use
parolees per capita and stops per capita for most of our analysis, but we
display our first set of results using both count and rate variables for ease of
comprehension. The results are highly consistent, regardless of which
method is used.
The summary statistics show that there is high variance in both
parolees and stops, but is this variance random? To begin to address that
question, we next map the geographic incidence of that variance. From this,
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we see that not only is each variable distributed nonrandomly, but also
there appears to be a strong relationship between the two.
Figure 1 presents maps of the New York City population, first by
density of parolees (Map A) and then by incidence of police stops (Map B).
These two maps illustrate a strong coincidence between our two main
variables of interest. Comparing them indicates that it is largely the same
zip codes that have zero or close to zero parolee residents and those zip
codes that have no or few stops. The same applies for medium and highdensity rates of each variable. When we contrast this to the map of the
general city population (Map C), it is clear there is also significant
crossover between both stops and parolee density and population density
generally: parolees tend to live in high-density neighborhoods and the
police conduct most stops in high-density neighborhoods. However, the
highest density of both parolees and stops occurs within a subset of the
most densely populated parts of the city—and it is the same subset for both
our variables of interest. Clearly then, controlling for population is
important, but population does not fully explain which areas the police
choose to target.
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FIGURE 1. New York City Population Density Maps by Parolees and Stops
MAP A. Parolees

MAP B. Police Stops
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MAP D. Parolees and Police Stops
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When the incidence of parolees and stops are overlaid (Map D), we
gain a strong impression that our two variables co-vary significantly—there
is manifestly some kind of relationship between the two. We see below in
our formal regression analysis that this relationship is statistically
significant, but it is also clear from visual inspection that the relationship is
substantively significant. The largest triangles, which represent the densest
population of parolees, are approximately twenty times greater than the
lowest category; similarly, the darkest regions, which represent the highest
frequency of police stops, are approximately ten times greater than the
lowest category. The largest triangles only occur in the two darkest shaded
regions of the city. These maps show actual rates of parolees and stops, but
the relationship is not undermined when instead we normalize by
population. The correlation between parolees per capita and stops per
capita is a solid 0.54.306 Clearly then, police are stopping individuals where
parolees reside at far greater rates than individuals in parolee sparse
districts.
Of course, that relationship could be illusory: both variables could be
driven by some other factor(s). To determine which variables we should
control and whether the correlation between parolees and stops is real or
spurious, we need to think first about the mechanism by which police are
likely to target parolees. In Floyd v. City of New York, the case on racial
profiling by the NYPD, the claim was that police observe individuals of
minority races and stop them because of their race, rather than because of
any suspicious activity.307 In some cases, parolee status may be similarly
observed: individual parolees will be known to individual police officers.
As discussed, parole officers and the NYPD participate in joint ride-alongs
and share a criminal database. Police officers may also have been involved
in the parolee’s arrest, or officers, walking their beat, may have had prior
contact with the individuals after their release on parole. In other cases, the
officer may be considering parolee status probabilistically: the officer
knows that the neighborhood has a high rate of parolee residences, either
because the officer knows the neighborhood well, or because of publicly
available cues, such as the presence of halfway houses. Knowing a
neighborhood has a high rate of parolees, an officer conducting a stop is
306. The correlation coefficient measures the strength of the linear relationship between two
variables. It ranges between -1 (a perfect negative relationship) through 0 (no relationship) to 1 (a
perfect positive relationship). The square of the coefficient is generally interpreted as the percentage of
variation in one variable that can be explained by the other. A correlation between 0.5 and 1 is generally
considered to be a moderately strong relationship. DAVID M. LANE, ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO
STATISTICS 170 (1993).
307. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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likely to ask an individual, “Are you on parole?” since, as discussed earlier,
a positive answer lowers the threshold for a search of the individual.
Effective screening is likely both because parolees face serious
consequences for lying to the police about their status and because police
on the street now typically carry handheld devices through which they can
quickly check an individual’s parole status.
Similarly, most police are also likely to know which areas are largely
made up of low-income households and to use income as a screening
device for suspicion. Income is often roughly visually apparent at the
individual level based on clothing, hair, idle presence on the street during
business hours, and the like. Furthermore, police are likely to target highcrime areas, which strongly tend to be low-income areas. At the same time,
parolees can be expected to live in low-income neighborhoods. As such,
low income could conceivably explain the apparent relationship between
parolees and stops. In fact, low income is correlated with police stops at
0.46, and with parolees at 0.54. These are solid relationships that imply it is
important to control for income in our regression analysis.
The difference is that while low income might be a proxy for
suspicion in the eyes of many police officers, it does not translate to greater
powers of searching with a lower threshold, as does parolee status. Parolee
frequency serves a threefold advantage: as a proxy for crime (given high
recidivism rates), as a means of leverage (as discussed in Part III.B), and as
a means of lowering the threshold for further intrusion on Fourth
Amendment rights. As such, we recognize the need to control for other
screening mechanisms such as low income, but we do not expect it to
capture, or even be as informative as, the effects of parolee density, simply
because of the incentives for police to focus on parolee status.
There are other variables that could play a similar role. The fraction of
non-white or Hispanic residents in the neighborhood is correlated at 0.46
with stops and 0.62 with parolees. Single-parent households correlate with
stops at 0.53 and with parolees at 0.68. As such, it is important to control
for all of these variables in our statistical analyses. A final factor that we
might expect could also constitute an omitted variable is the crime rate, but
we do not control for this factor. Doing so could create a reverse causation
problem. Significantly more stops are likely to occur in high-crime
neighborhoods, but stops—and the subsequent arrests—constitute one of
the primary means by which crime rates themselves are determined. As
such, we cannot include crime rate as a control, but between our control
variables of income, race, and single-parent household, we are likely to
have captured much of the screening effect of high crime rates.
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Furthermore, we are able to control for crime rates in other ways when we
look at the individual data.
To examine the relationship between parolee density and stops, we
first graphically represent the correlation between them, as well as the
relationship between each and the incidence of low-income residents.
Figure 2A represents the association between parolee density and police
stop frequency, in nominal rates. Figure 2B represents the same
relationship normalized by population. The two scatter plots are of each zip
code, with the density of parolees and parolees per capita, respectively,
displayed on the X axes, and stops and stops per capita displayed on the Y
axes. The diagonal lines are the lines that best fit each zip code’s paroleestop relationship.
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FIGURE 2. Police Stops by Parolees and Parolees Per Capita
FIGURE 2A. Police Stops by Parolees

FIGURE 2B. Police Stops by Parolees Per Capita
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There is a manifest positive relationship between our two variables of
interest, and this relationship becomes even clearer when population is
considered. Most zip codes cluster around the low parolee-stop region
(lower left corner), and stops become significantly more frequent as parolee
density increases (upper right corner).
The gray shaded regions are the 95% confidence intervals of the fitted
value lines for each figure. The confidence interval is a measure of
uncertainty: we can say with 95% confidence that the true relationship
between the two variables is a line within the shaded area. Here, the
confidence range is narrow around the high gradient of the line, showing
there is significant difference between zip codes and that substantial
increases in parolees are correlated with substantial increases in stops, with
less than a 5% chance of random variation explaining the apparent
relationship between the two variables.
B. REGRESSION RESULTS: STOP DATA
Our various descriptive statistics have provided a strong
impressionistic account of the relationship between parolee density and
police stops. To better discern that relationship while controlling for other
factors, we now conduct Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis
(“OLS”), including these control variables. Table 2 shows the results.

2014]

THE ATTRITION OF RIGHTS UNDER PAROLE

955

TABLE 2. Stops Per Capita & Stops as a Product of Parolee Density, and
Control Variables
Variables
Parolee per capita

Stops Per Capita
10.78**

Stops
…

(2.80)
Parolee

…

17.64**
(2.94)

Income below $25,000
Non-white / Hispanic
Single-parent household
Population

0.04

995.22

(0.06)

(2325.25)

0.01

777.14

(0.03)

(1037.85)

0.11

2771.30

(0.08)

(3844.00)

…

0.04
(0.01)

Intercept

308

0.02

-999.42

(0.01)

(516.37)

Number of ZIP Codes

176

179

Adjusted R2

0.33

0.67

*

= p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01309

308. This captures the point where the regression line crosses the y-axis, when all our independent
variables are set to zero—that is, how many stops are predicted to occur when there are no parolees, no
single-parent households, etc. in the neighborhood. The number of stops predicted under those
circumstances is not differentiable from zero.
309. The p-value is the measure of how likely the data is to have occurred by chance if the null
hypothesis is true. The lower the p-value, the more certain we can be that the effect is nonrandom. A pvalue of 0.05 is the standard measure for statistical significance; a p-value of 0.01 is the standard
measure of being highly statistically significant. They translate to a 95% and a 99% confidence of a
genuine effect having occurred, respectively. DAVID M. LANE, ET AL., supra note 306, at 376
(explaining statistical significance and significance testing).
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The first column of Table 2 shows per capita parolee rates regressed
on per capita stops, with the standard deviation below in parentheses. The
second column shows nominal parolee density rates regressed on nominal
police stops, with population as a control variable. For both models, we
control for income, race, and single-parent household status. Here, our race
variable shows the fraction of non-white or Hispanic residents in the zip
code. In the individual Frisk, Search, and Arrest Data, below, we use both
this community race variable and an individualized race variable.
As predicted, the parolee coefficients in both models are positive and
highly statistically significant. The p-values of 0.00 for each of the parolee
coefficients mean that we have a 99% confidence level that there is a
relationship between parolee residency and police stops. This provides
strong support for our hypothesis that the density of parolees residing in a
neighborhood also significantly increases the frequency of police stops.310
All of our control variables—frequency of low income, minority race, and
single-parent households—are also positive, as expected. However, none of
the controls except population reach statistical significance—not even race.
We discuss the significance of our race nonresults in the next section.
The parolee-per-capita coefficient of 10.78 means that increasing
parolees per capita by 1 increases stops per capita more than tenfold. For
example, increasing parolees per capita by 0.001 per capita would increase
stops per capita by 0.011. Similarly, the parolee-rate coefficient of 17.64
means that an increase in a given zip code by one parolee increases the
average number of stops by almost 18. These are large changes—remember
that we are not measuring the number of stops of parolees, but the number
of stops of all people in the overall zip code, subject to the variation of
parolees residing in the neighborhood. Given that even in the most dense
parolee neighborhood, the vast majority of people are not parolees, this is a
massive effect. So as well as being statistically significant, our results have
310. Parolee rates also maintain statistical significance in other models not reported here. The only
model in which parolees per capita fractionally loses statistical significance is when all the control
variables are included and unemployment is also included. Unemployment has a high correlation with
single-family status, to the point where it effectively double counts in the regression. In fact, the
adjusted R-squared actually decreases when unemployment is included. We consider that single-family
status is more relevant for our inquiry than unemployment, given that income is already controlled. This
is particularly true given that the unemployment rate does not count those who have dropped out of the
labor force. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION—MARCH 2014, at 2 (2014),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf. Even including unemployment, parolee density
nevertheless remains significant when not normalized by population. Additional analysis available from
the authors.
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considerable substantive significance.
We can consider the overall effect of the difference between a
medium-density parolee neighborhood and a high-density parolee
neighborhood on the predicted rate of stops. We do this by looking at how
many stops occur when all variables are set at the median and how many
stops occur when parolees are set at some other level. Looking at parolees
per capita and stops per capita, an increase of one standard deviation311 in
parolees per capita translates to about a 24% increase in stops per capita.
That is, almost one-quarter of the variation between neighborhoods is
explained by an increase of one standard deviation in parolees per capita.
Similarly, an increase in the parolee rate from the median value, 39, by one
standard deviation to 111, translates to stops per capita increasing from
2374 stops to 3638, an increase of about 53%.
Given the high divergence between neighborhoods, in terms of both
stops and parolee rates, and given that the vast majority of both occur in
only a handful of zip codes, it is also worth comparing the top and bottom
tenth percentile zip codes. All other things being equal, the bottom decile
zip code has only approximately one parolee; the ninetieth percentile has
252. The difference in the expected number of stops is 1704 versus 6131.
Moving from the lowest parolee-dense bracket of neighborhoods to the
highest translates to a 260% increase in the number of stops. The same
movement when measured in parolees per capita results in an 88%
increase.
In terms of overall explanatory power, our stop models do very well.
Once our key variable of interest, parolee density, is included along with
the control variables, the R-squared of both regression models is high. The
variation in police stops when considering the control variables plus either
parolee per capita or parolee rates, respectively, is 33% and 67%. This
means that our parolee independent variable and the control variables have
explained a large proportion of police choice in stopping individuals.
The fact that we are showing a double-digit increase in the number of
overall stops in a zip code, not the stops of parolees alone, shows strong
support for the argument that both individual parolees and the community
generally are being dramatically affected by the permissive police parolee
stop and search jurisprudence. Given that parolees form a very small
percentage of the population even in high-density neighborhoods, if there
311. When data is distributed normally, one standard deviation in either direction from the median
accounts for 34.1% of the distribution.
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was not an effect on the community, in order to explain these numbers,
parolees would have to be being stopped at well beyond the 10- or 18-fold
increase indicated by the coefficients, but closer to thousands of stops in a
year—or multiple stops per parolee per day. Far more plausible is the
conclusion that police are targeting high parolee neighborhoods but
regularly stopping nonparolees. Thus the lowered rights of parolees have
the effect of diminishing the rights of their neighbors, an effect the Samson
court never endorsed.
C. INDIVIDUAL FRISK, SEARCH AND ARREST: DESCRIPTIVE DATA
We now turn to the question of what happens after the police have
stopped an individual—do they frisk, search, and/or arrest the individual?
Our individual Frisk, Search, and Arrest Data comprises over 678,000
observations, where each observation is an instance of a police officer
stopping a person in New York City in 2011, rather than stops at the zip
code level. It also contains demographic detail about every individual who
was stopped.
The difficulty for the second prong of our investigation—whether,
once stopped, parole status affects whether a secondary Terry outcome
occurs—is that we do not know the parolee status of the individual stopped,
only the parolee density of the zip code. We hypothesize that there is a link
not only between whether an individual is a parolee and whether the
individual will be stopped, but also with whether he or she will then be
frisked, searched, and/or arrested. But for us to find such effects, given that
the data is aggregated and nonspecified for parole status, police would have
to be targeting parolees consistently enough for the effect to show at the
aggregate level. Thus, this difficulty is in some ways a strength: if we can
find support for our hypotheses that parolees are subjected to more searches
and arrests based on this aggregate data, then the effect of police targeting
of parolees must be strong indeed.
Table 3 provides the descriptive information about our second
database. Table 3A details the breakdown of our dependent variables, the
Terry actions taken following a stop (whether the individual was frisked,
searched, and/or arrested), and the central control variable of race. Column
1 provides the racial breakdown of those stopped and Column 2 provides
the racial breakdown of the general population of New York City. Note that
the latter data was gathered from a different source, uses slightly different
categorizations, and is for 2010 rather 2011. Nonetheless, it provides a
mechanism for rough comparisons. Table 3B lists the breakdown of the
Terry factors specified by the police as reasons justifying each stop.
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Two variables listed at the bottom of Table 3B are factors in whether
the police chose to frisk the individual, rather than reasons to stop the
individual. The first is furtive movements, a variable that can be a factor in
a suspect being stopped or frisked. Furtive movements were a sign of
suspicion used to justify the majority of stops, and also the majority of
frisks.312 The second factor is knowledge of the suspect’s prior criminal
behavior, which is one indication that, at least in some cases, police have
knowledge of individuals’ criminal history, as we discuss further below.
This factor is the closest we have to the parolee status of the individual
stopped, although obviously it does not distinguish between convicts and
parolees. We expect this to have a positive relationship with searches and
arrests. We discuss each of these variables in greater detail below.
Remember that the percentages listed are of those already stopped.

312. Furtive movements are pointed to in order to justify the frisk in 70.84% of frisks, but this is
only 39.77% of all observations, since frisks occur in approximately half of stops.
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TABLE 3A. Frisk, Search, and Arrest Data (Terry Outcome and Race)
Percentage of
stopped
individuals,
2011

Percentage of
New York City
population,
2010313

Terry Action
Frisk

56.14

Search

8.44

Arrest

5.91

Race
50.59

Black/African
American NonHispanic

22.8314

Black Hispanic

7.00

Hispanic Origin

28.6

White Hispanic

26.40

Black

Asian

3.43

Asian NonHispanic

12.6

White NonHispanic

8.90

White NonHispanic

33.3

Other

3.85

Other

2.7

Number of stops: 678,092

313. Results from the 2010 Census: Population Growth and Race/Hispanic Composition, CITY OF
N.Y. 14 (2011), http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/census/census2010/pgrhc.pdf.
314. The United States Census Bureau estimates African Americans as 25.5% of the population, but
that seems to include “Black Hispanics.” State & County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3651000.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
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TABLE 3B. Frisk, Search, and Arrest Data (Terry Factors)
Terry Factors

Percentage of stopped individuals, 2011

Area has high crime
incidence

58.75

Furtive movements (stop)

51.85

Casing a victim or location

32.07

Proximity to scene of
offense

21.09

Suspect acting as a lookout

17.96

Fits a relevant description

15.68

Ongoing investigation

14.27

Report by victim / witness /
officer

11.29

Actions of engaging in a
violent crime

10.32

Suspicious bulge

7.98

Actions indicative of a
drug transaction

7.26

Wearing clothes commonly
used in a crime

4.54

Associating with known
criminals

4.12

Carrying suspicious object

2.36

Other
Frisk Factors
Furtive movements (frisk)
Knowledge of suspect’s
prior criminal behavior
(frisk)
Total

16.33
Percentage of individuals frisked, 2011
70.84
1.57

166.35
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The first set of variables described is the Terry actions taken by the
police. The rates of arrests and searches are considerably lower than the
rate of frisks—more than half of those stopped are frisked, compared to
single digit percentages for searches and arrests. This is not surprising since
to conduct a frisk the police ordinarily need only have reasonable
articulable suspicion that the individual may be carrying a concealed
weapon that could pose a danger to the officers,315 whereas conducting an
arrest or an actual search requires probable cause, a more rigorous
standard.316 But as described, the jurisprudence surrounding the rights of
parolees permits both thresholds to be effectively lowered in numerous
ways.
Previously, we hypothesized that parolee density would be positively
correlated with police stops, which our results from the first database
supported. Here we similarly expect that searches and arrests will be
positively correlated with parolee density. We expect that as well as
targeting parolees for stops, having stopped a parolee, police will have the
power and incentive to search parolees at higher rates than others who have
been stopped. And given that searches form the primary basis for arrest
stemming from Terry stops, the rate of arrests should also be higher for
parolees.
In addition to the direct effect on parolees, the leverage effects we
described in Part III.B should also spill over to the families and cotenants
of parolees, and even the wider community. By targeting parolee-dense
neighborhoods, police will conduct more stops against nonparolees in those
zip codes, giving them more of an opportunity to develop probable cause
against nonparolees, even those who are unrelated to parolees.
Consequently, we expect to see an increase in searches and arrests in
parolee-dense neighborhoods, even when looking at aggregate numbers of
stops.
Our expectation for the relationship between parolee density and frisks
is more complex. For the reasons just summarized, New York police
effectively face a lower threshold for searching parolees than nonparolees,
315. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (“And in justifying the particular intrusion the police
officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”). The fact that nonetheless the majority
of people stopped are frisked arguably illustrates the lax nature of the reasonable suspicion standard
under Terry.
316. Courts require that “facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man
of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been committed.” Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307, 322 (1959) (quoting Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878)).
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given that parolee status allows otherwise unsuspicious factors to be
considered suspicious, and even evidence that violates the standard will not
be suppressed at parole hearings. This gives less incentive to police to
conduct a frisk instead of a full search when they have stopped a parolee.
Thus, while we expect a positive relationship between parolee status and
searches and arrests, we could see a negative relationship between frisks
and parolee status. However, if this frisk-skipping effect exists, it only
applies to parolees; it does not share the spillover effect described for
searches and arrests. As such, even if police are skipping frisks for all
parolees who are stopped, it may be hard to show this effect, since our data
captures stops of all individuals without differentiating between parolees
and nonparolees, factoring only the relative density of neighborhoods by
parolee rates.
It may seem likely that if police target parolees, they may also target
convicts generally. Given recidivism rates, convict status might serve as a
proxy for suspicion for many police officers. However, as with our
discussion of low income, we argue that parole status is special because it
not only may serve as a proxy for suspicion, but also it allows police to
search with a lower threshold of cause. Those who have served time in
prison but have completed their parole period are not subject to the more
permissive search rules we have detailed. The difference between the single
advantage of targeting convicts—as a proxy for crime—and the triple
advantage of targeting parolees—as a proxy for crime, as a means of
leverage, and as a means of lowering the threshold for closer investigation
without regard for normal Fourth Amendment rights—allows us to
differentiate between targeting of parolees versus convicts. If police are just
targeting high convict areas, we should observe an increase in all three
Terry outcomes; if they are targeting parolees in particular, we should see
that heightened parolee density leads to an increase in searches and arrests
but a decrease in frisks, given the fact of a stop.
The second set of variables in Table 3 is the individual race variables.
As before in our Stop Data, we again control for the racial makeup of the
zip code that the individuals are stopped in, but here we also control for the
race of each individual stopped by the police. The numbers in Table 3
provide the prima facie case in the challenge to police practices in the
Floyd case. According to the records of the police themselves, the majority
of people stopped by the police are black (even excluding black Hispanics),
whereas less than one quarter of the general population is black. In
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contrast, less than 10% of those stopped are non-Hispanic whites.317 The
city’s defense to the implication of racial discrimination was that minorities
commit more crimes. However, the judge in Floyd rejected this argument,
since “[t]here is no basis for assuming that an innocent population shares
the same characteristics as the criminal suspect population in the same
area.”318
The third set of variables in Table 3 is the Terry factors—the
conditions that gave rise to the reasonable, articulable suspicion that
justified the initial stop. Since we are now looking at individual
observations rather than at the zip code level, it is safe to incorporate the
crime rate. As Table 3 shows, the most common Terry factor is that the
individual was in a high-crime neighborhood. The second most common
Terry factor was that the individual was displaying furtive movements.
Displaying furtive movements is a highly subjective characterization, one
that is difficult for anyone to challenge, and so it gives police enormous
discretion in articulating reasonable suspicion. Both high-crime
neighborhood and furtive movements were pointed to in over half of the
stops made, yet the correlation between them is only 0.05. This indicates
that almost every Terry stop in our data was justified either by occurring in
a high-crime neighborhood or by an individual’s furtive movements. The
total percentage of Terry factors listed is 166.35%—this implies that for the
average stop, 1.66 Terry factors were detailed. Thus, police either choose to
target individuals in a high-crime neighborhood or they subjectively
characterize an individual’s movements as furtive, then they typically only
point to at most one other suspicion-generating factor to have effective
discretion over the determination of reasonable articulable suspicion in the
vast majority of stops.
D. REGRESSION RESULTS: INDIVIDUAL FRISK, SEARCH, AND ARREST
DATA
Table 4 shows the results of our regressions for the Frisk, Search, and
Arrest Data. Table 4 contains three separate regressions, one for each Terry
outcome—frisk, search and arrest. We report the OLS regressions, since
they are the most intuitively comprehensible. However, since now our three
dependent (outcome) variables are binary—each Terry outcome of frisk,
317. For the details of the claim of police racial targeting, see generally Jeffrey Fagan, Second
Supplemental Report, CTR. CONST. RTS. 11 (2012), http://www.ccrjustice.org/files/
FaganSecondSupplementalReport.pdf. Fagan’s expert report was considered as evidence in Floyd v.
City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
318. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 560.
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search and/or arrest either occurs or does not occur—we also conduct the
analysis using both logit and probit. These methods use the probability of
the dependent variable occurring as the outcome. For instance, instead of
an either-or outcome for whether a search occurred, logit and probit
regressions determine the probability of a search occurring, contingent on
the independent variables of interest, such as parole status.319 All of the
results using either logit or probit are consistent with the OLS results
reported in Table 4.320 We display a more meaningful interpretation of the
results of the logit regressions in Figure 3 below.

319. Logit and probit are both designed for estimation of nonlinear effects, in particular for
determining the effect of binary outcomes. Whereas OLS estimates the marginal, linear effect of each
additional unit of the X variable on the Y variable (for example, how many additional stops are
associated with each additional parolee living in the neighborhood), logit and probit estimate the
contrasting probability of Y occurring or not occurring, subject to variation in X (for example, how
likely an individual is to be frisked, arrested or searched, or for none of the these events to occur,
depending on parolee density in the neighborhood). See generally Forrest D. Nelson, Logit, Probit and
Togit, in ECONOMETRICS: THE NEW PALGRAVE 136 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1990). The difference
between logit and probit arises from the assumptions made about the distribution of the error term.
Whereas logit assumes a logistic distribution, probit assumes a normal distribution. VANI K. BOROOAH,
LOGIT AND PROBIT: ORDERED AND MULTINOMIAL MODELS 9 (2001).
320. These coefficients do not have an intuitive meaning without being converted into either odds
ratios or probabilities. The reason for this is that a logit coefficient represents a movement along a
nonlinear scale; consequently the effect of a 1 unit change in the independent variable will depend on
the point at which that change begins. Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, & Matthew M. Schneider, On
the Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811, 1813 (2006).
Logit and probit regressions cannot be interpreted directly beyond whether the coefficients are positive
or negative, and whether they are statistically significant. All of the logit and probit regressions of our
data follow the same patterns reported in our OLS data, both as to whether the coefficients are positive
or negative, and the level of statistical significance. The only exceptions are that single-parent status is a
significant factor in arrests at the 0.01 level using both logit and probit; white individual is not
significant for arrests when using logit but is significant when using probit; and income under $25,000
is significant when parolee rates are used to predict arrests, but not when parolees per capita are used,
under logit and probit regressions. Overall, our OLS regressions are more conservative than either the
logit or probit regressions, so we report the OLS results.
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TABLE 4. Frisk, Search, and Arrest as a Product of Parolee Per Capita, and
Control Variables
Frisk

Search

Arrest

-2.96**

3.73*

5.87*

(0.52)

(0.29)*

(0.00)*

Community traits
Parolee per capita
Non-white /
Hispanic
Income below
$25,000
Single-parent
households

0.18**
(0.00)
0.30

**

(0.01)
-0.20

**

(0.01)

0.01*
(0.00)
0.03

*

(0.00)
0.12

-0.00
*

-0.00
*

*

(0.01)

(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.10

*

(0.01)

Individual traits / Terry factors
White individual
Proximity to scene
of offense
Associating with
known criminals
Area has high crime
incidence
Report by victim /
witness / officer
Ongoing
investigation

-0.08**

0.00*

0.00*

(0.00)

(0.00)*

(0.00)*

0.02*

0.01*

(0.00)*

(0.00)*

0.01*

0.01*

(0.00)

(0.00)*

(0.00)*

0.02*

-0.01*

0.02*

(0.00)

(0.00)*

(0.00)*

0.01*

0.09*

(0.00)*

(0.00)*

0.01*

0.00*

(0.00)*

(0.00)*

0.06*

0.03*

(0.00)*

(0.00)*

0.08*

0.07*

(0.00)

(0.00)*

(0.00)*

Adjusted R2:
0.02

Adjusted R2:
0.01

Adjusted R2:
0.02

0.02**
(0.00)
0.10**

0.04**
(0.00)
0.07**
(0.00)

Prior knowledge of
criminal history

…

Intercept

0.37**

Number of stops:
652,377
*

= p < 0.05; ** = p <0.01
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Most significantly, our parolee per capita variable is again in the
direction hypothesized and highly statistically significant for each of our
three regressions. The results are unchanged when using parole rates.321
Frisks are negatively associated with being in a parolee-dense area,
whereas searches and arrests are positively associated with being in a
parolee-dense area. This supports our theory that (1) not only do police
target parolee-rich areas for increased stops, but also they utilize permissive
rules that enable them to search parolees more easily, skipping the
intermediary step of frisking; that (2) they subject parolees to significantly
more searches; and that (3) consequently more arrests are made of parolees.
This also suggests that police are not simply targeting convicts, but are
specifically targeting parolees; otherwise, if police were targeting convicts
generally, we would see positive coefficients on all three Terry outcome
variables.
However, the substantive significance of these results varies
considerably for the three different inquiries. The coefficients reported
describe the average effect for each outcome. The frisk, search, and arrest
terms of -2.96, 3.73, and 5.87, respectively, mean that on average, an
increase in the parolee per capita population by one percentage point would
decrease the per capita risk of being frisked by 2.96%, increase the per
capita chance of being searched by 3.73%, and increase the per capita
chance of being arrested by 5.87%. But the relative size of the three
coefficients somewhat understates the differing effect for each variable, as
illustrated when we once again compare the effect of an increase of one
standard deviation from the median for each regression. While a change of
one standard deviation in parolees per capita almost doubles the number of
parolees in a zip code (an approximately 80% increase), the associated
decrease in the probability of being frisked is 1.1%, which is relatively
slight. As such, the effect for frisks, although statistically significant, is
quite small. For searches, the same increase in parolees per capita increases
the predicted probability of being searched by 12.9%, a considerably more
substantively significant increase that is more than ten times the negative
effect for frisks. For arrests, the effect is greater still. An 80% increase in
parolees per capita is associated with a 35.6% increase in arrests following
a stop, an effect that is 30-fold larger than for frisks and a threefold larger
than for searches.
When we again compare the top and bottom deciles, a shift from the
bottom to the top parolee per capita decile results in the predicted rate of
321.

Results available from the authors.
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stops increasing by about 87%; the predicted rate of frisks decreasing by
only 2.8%; the predicted rate of searches increasing by a moderate 37%;
and the predicted rate of arrests increasing a substantial 141%.
Consequently, we can have confidence statistically that each
hypothesized parole effect on Terry outcomes occurs, but the negative
effect for frisks is substantially less distinct than the positive effect of
parolee density on searches and the overwhelmingly positive effect on
arrests. The most obvious reason is that, once stopped, an individual is
more likely than not to be frisked, regardless of parolee status, whereas
searches and arrests occur far more selectively, and so parolee status seems
to have more of an impact on whether the police search or arrest.322
Furthermore, remember that we are examining the effect of parolee
jurisprudence on not only parolees who are stopped, but also on
nonparolees who are stopped. Only for parolees can the police expect to
need less suspicion for a search than probable cause to be able to use
anything found to develop probable cause for an arrest. As anticipated, we
observe a much bigger impact in the search and arrest statistics than in frisk
statistics. We believe this is because the pool of parolees in the population
of individuals who are searched and arrested is far more concentrated, since
the police are targeting parolees at higher rates than nonparolees. The frisk
effect we describe may be real, but identifying it is difficult: the numbers
are diluted by frisks of nonparolees, since ultimately frisking stopped
individuals is the norm.
In fact, the relationship between parolee density and Terry outcomes
must be quite high for our results to appear at all, since our data covers all
frisks, searches, and arrests, as discussed in our hypotheses section. It is for
this reason that we see a very low R-squared. This effect is normal in
individual studies of this kind. We do not have high predictive levels since
most people will not be searched or arrested, even those who are stopped.
322. The classification that the police use makes no apparent distinction between pre- and postarrest searches. Thus, it is unclear how many of the searches are searches incident to arrest. The
correlation between arrests and searches is slightly less than one half (0.4956), so they are clearly not
perfectly correlated. In terms of conditional probabilities, if an individual is searched, the odds that he
or she was frisked are extremely high (95.7%), but the odds of being frisked even when not searched
are still better than even (52.5%). In contrast, people are seldom searched without being frisked (0.03%
of all cases), whereas almost half the people are frisked but never searched (48% of stops). Once
frisked, the conditional probability of being searched is 14.3%, and the odds of being searched when not
frisked are 0.8%. That 0.8% can arise in two possible scenarios: when the police have probable cause
early in the encounter such that they are likely to search immediately without bothering with the frisk,
or with parolees, for whom they require only reasonable suspicion to search rather than probable cause.
With parolees constituting only 0.02% of the overall population, they may well be routinely
prophylactically searched and thus make up a large portion of those who are searched but not frisked.

2014]

THE ATTRITION OF RIGHTS UNDER PAROLE

969

Put another way, there is a lot of noise inherent in our data. As such, our
theory is greatly buoyed by the fact that we are able to find an effect, even
though we are looking at aggregated data for all stops rather than stops of
parolees only.
These results assume that the effects must all be linear. Next we use
logit to check whether the results are robust when that assumption is
relaxed. A good way to predict and interpret probabilities from a logit (or
probit) model is to create a simulation of the parameters based on the
regression and run that simulation again and again. Generally 1000 times is
adequate.323 Our logit regression involves multiple factors that vary
simultaneously, so to graph the relationship between just two of those
variables (the predicted probabilities of our Terry outcomes as against
parolees per capita), we have to choose a setting for each of the control
variables. Households earning under $25,000 and single-parent households
are both continuous variables, so we set them to their means. All the other
control variables are dichotomous, and most occur rarely, so we set them to
zero, with two exceptions: first, as mentioned, the majority of stops occur
in high-crime neighborhoods, so we set that variable to one; second, since
race is generally considered to be of particular significance in stops, we
conduct our analysis for both stops of minorities and stops of whites. We
then use a program that draws 1000 sets of simulated parameters for each
variable, creating a new set of variables for each coefficient324 that we
graph in Figure 3.
323. See Michael Tomz et al., Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical
Results, J. STAT. SOFTWARE, Jan. 2003, at 1, 3, 6, available at http://www.jstatsoft.org/v08/i01/paper
(prescribing a Monte Carlo method of stochastic simulation for each parameter, with 1000 draws from
the distribution usually being sufficient).
324. Id. at 5 (“Clarify uses stochastic simulation techniques to help researchers interpret and
present their statistical results. It uses whatever statistical model you have chosen and, as such, changes
no statistical assumptions. As a first step, the program draws simulations of the main and ancillary
parameters from . . . their asymptomatic sampling distribution, in most cases a multivariate normal with
mean equal to the vector of parameter estimates . . . and variance equal to the variance-covariance
matrix of estimates . . . .”).
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FIGURE 3. Changes in the Logit Predicted Probability of Frisks, Searches,
and Arrests, By Parolees Per Capita, For Whites and Non-Whites, in HighCrime Neighborhoods
FIGURE 3A. Whites

FIGURE 3B. Non-Whites
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Figures 3A and 3B display parolees per capita on the x-axis and the
probabilities of frisks, searches, and arrests on the y-axis. In both figures,
searches and arrests increase consistently with parolees and frisks decrease
consistently. The slope of each vector appears compressed by the large
difference in scale. Recall that the base probability of being frisked is more
than 50%, whereas the base probability of being searched or arrested is less
than 10%. The change in each variable is comfortably outside the 95%
shaded confidence interval. (In other words, the shift on the y-axis is
greater than the shaded range on that axis.)
The results are robust. We also conducted all of the frisk, search, and
arrest regressions including fixed effects dummy variables for each of the
76 police precincts in our data. This essentially adds a control variable for
each different police precinct, which allows unknown idiosyncratic
differences between neighborhoods or precincts to be accounted for
without affecting our results. This enables us to be confident that there is
no omitted variable bias due to the fact that high parolee per capita
neighborhoods are “bad neighborhoods” in a way not captured by our
control variables, such as high crime incidence. It also immunizes the data
to problems arising from differences between different policies in different
police precincts. The signs and significance of our three dependent
variables remain the same for these regressions.325
All of the control variables are highly significant at the p < 0.01 level,
except for three in the arrest regression, which are not statistically
significant at any level, and almost all are in the direction expected. It is
worth noting that both race variables are significant, but not consistently in
the direction expected. An expert report from the Floyd litigation found
that individuals were being targeted for police stops on the basis of their
race, but the report did not take account of parolee status.326 Our results
show that the effect of race is more complicated once parolee status is
accounted for. As stated previously in relation to the probability of being
stopped, the non-white/Hispanic variable is again positive for frisks and
searches, meaning that the likelihood of being frisked or searched if you are
in a minority-dense neighborhood is significantly higher than if you are in a
predominantly white neighborhood. However, the individual race variable,
325. The effects in these regressions are in fact stronger for frisks and searches, with coefficients
of -5.22 and 4.06, respectively. The effect for arrests is slightly lower, with a coefficient of 4.16, but the
coefficient is still positive and highly statistically significant. Additional results available from the
authors.
326. Fagan, supra note 317, at 18 tbl.5.
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“white individual,” is negative for frisks and positive for searches and
arrests. Thus, once stopped, whites are less likely to be frisked but more
likely to be searched or arrested.
This is reflected in that the only real difference between Figures 3A
and 3B is that, consistent with the OLS results, non-whites are consistently
frisked at higher rates than whites, but they are searched and arrested at
lower rates. Thus whether using OLS or logit, parolees per capita is
consistently associated with increased searches and arrests, and decreased
frisks, and race has effects in both directions.
This does not show that police are not targeting minorities, since our
Stop Data showed that police stop people in densely minority
neighborhoods at significantly higher rates than in predominantly white
neighborhoods. The lowered frisk result supports previous studies that have
shown that “hit rates”—the proportion of searches that actually result in
finding contraband—are higher for whites than minorities, which suggests
that the level of suspicion necessary for a white person to be stopped may
be higher than for a minority in the eyes of the police.327 However it does
complicate the picture somewhat: this data does not show that searches and
arrests are higher for minorities; that is only true for frisks. Together, the
results of our two databases imply that police may be targeting high
minority neighborhoods rather than minorities themselves.
Two other aberrant results are that single-parent households are
negatively correlated with frisks, as are searches within areas having high
crime incidence. We have no clear theory for these two results. Otherwise,
all of the community traits are positively associated with searches and
frisks, consistent with our Stop Data. (The coefficients for arrests are nondifferentiable from zero.) All of the other Terry factors are positively
related to each Terry outcome. This is unsurprising since each of these
factors contributes towards reasonable suspicion, and each is used to justify
each police action.
One variable worthy of particular scrutiny is the frisk being justified
(at least in part) by knowledge of prior criminal history. The knowledge of
327. L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035,
2037–38 (2011) (summarizing hit rates in six different states and cities and showing that some
minorities are often twice as likely to be stopped as whites, yet the hit rate for whites is often one and a
half or more times greater). For a critique of whether these discrepancies in hit rates necessarily
establish racial discrimination, see Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the
Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1299 (2004) (arguing that whether racial profiling will decrease the amount of
profile crime depends on the elasticity of each racial groups’ willingness to offend).
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criminal history factor is used to justify frisks, so we have to omit it from
the frisk regression, but it is positively associated with searches and arrests.
This variable is somewhat of a proxy, albeit an over-inclusive one, for
knowledge of the individual’s parole status. Our Stop Data supports the
theory that police often have knowledge of either individual parolee status
or of parolee density in a given neighborhood. The positive and significant
result for the knowledge of prior criminal history variable suggests that
knowledge of criminal history status, which may include parole status, may
also increase the police tendency to not only frisk but also to search and
arrest. However, it may not. The result may simply be driven by more
contraband being found when more frisks are undertaken, which is quite
plausible given recidivism rates. Nonetheless, the former view is further
supported by the fact that our results for the parolee-per-capita coefficients
for both searches and frisks are reduced when this variable is included.
This suggests that police do in fact have knowledge of parolee status—at
least after initiating contact, if not before initiating the stop—and so they
are more likely to stop, frisk, search, and arrest parolees. As mentioned,
this effect is so strong that we see it reflected in the fact that all stop, frisk,
search, and arrest rates are higher in neighborhoods with high parolee
density.
Our results do not prove that it is the parolees who are actually being
searched or arrested at higher rates It is likely, given the low numbers of
parolees even in high parolee density neighborhoods, that even if police
target high parolee neighborhoods, they will mostly stop nonparolees.
However, it is far harder to explain our results in the Frisk, Search, and
Arrest Data if the police are not targeting parolees. Even if police are
targeting high parolee neighborhoods but most or even all parolees
managed to slip through the net, their neighbors still pay the price for the
lower rights that the courts have deemed parolees to have. As such, our
results support the possibility that the Fourth Amendment rights of
nonparolees living in communities are being eroded by the various rules
that lower the rights of parolees. In fact, it is hard not to reach the
conclusion that nonparolee members of parolee-dense communities are
suffering because, as mentioned, our numbers are substantively significant
even though we are examining the effect of any person in the community
being stopped, arrested, and searched,328 not just parolees. Thus, these
statistics imply that nonparolees (who make up the vast majority of these
communities) are being negatively affected.
328. The negative result on the frisk coefficient means that we cannot draw a similar conclusion
for frisks.
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To summarize the key conclusions we can draw from the results of
our two databases:
1. Police target high parolee neighborhoods for increased stops.
2. Police are not simply targeting convicts, since frisks are
negatively associated with parolees per capita whereas
searches and arrests are positively associated.
3. Police are taking advantage of permissive parolee search rules
that allow them to search parolees with effectively lowered
standards of suspicion, since frisks are significantly lower yet
searches are significantly higher in high parolee
neighborhoods.
4. Arrests are positively associated with high parolee
neighborhoods, suggesting that permissive parolee search
rules may well be contributing to recidivism rates.
5. Nonparolees as well as parolees are likely being subjected to
increased stops, searches, and arrests, and so these rules are
having an adverse effect on the broader communities in which
parolees live.
CONCLUSION
This Article has cast serious doubt on the wisdom of the current parole
system in the United States. At every stage of their interactions with the
state, parolees’ rights are being diminished. Samson allows suspicionless
searches, and thus effectively makes arrests of parolees more likely. Even
in states such as New York that do not necessarily take full advantage of
Samson, police are nevertheless given greater deference in factors that
point towards suspicion when conducting Terry stops and frisks. Even
without Samson, the courts’ doctrine creates enormous leverage over
parolees for police and others alike, since the potential repercussions of
even ill-founded parole violations can result in three months of
imprisonment. All these effects undermine parolees’ residential options,
job opportunities, and stabilizing relationships, which are the fundamental
predictors of recidivism probabilities. At the same time, parole can even
extend rather than reduce incarceration of parolees, even beyond maximum
statutory terms. The goal behind these rules is strengthened law
enforcement in order to reduce recidivism rates. However, all of these
elements have rendered the parole system so punitive that not only does it
undermine the rehabilitative aims of the system, but also it increases
parolees’ likelihood to reoffend by making them vulnerable to influence
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and threats from law enforcement and criminal elements.
It is not only parolees who are bearing the cost of this jurisprudential
miscalculation. Our empirical results show that whole communities are
being adversely affected by these policies. Nonparolees who live in
parolee-dense neighborhoods are being stopped, searched, and arrested at
significantly higher rates, an effect not explained simply by high-crime
neighborhoods or by racial profiling. Punitive conditions that the Supreme
Court has approved for parolees cast a long shadow over nonparolees.
The modern parole jurisprudence needs to be reconsidered. However,
the whole solution does not lie with the courts. Institutions at every stage of
the parole process contribute to the attrition of rights that we describe.
Public defenders could better advise arrestees of the implications of
accepting plea bargains that involve parole. But many public defenders are
not as aware of the adverse effects of parole as they should be. This is a
product not only of the well-documented underfunding of those public
defenders, but also of the institutional structure of those institutions.329 For
instance, parole violation units are sometimes separated from other
divisions within public defender offices. Consequently, public defenders
negotiating plea deals do not have meaningful interactions with those
representing parolee recidivists, and so they can easily be unaware of the
repercussions for their clients when they return to court on parole
violations.
Similarly, parole offices are organized in such a way as to incentivize
reporting violations of release conditions. Each parolee in custody is one
less case in parole officers’ typically overburdened caseloads, so those
officers have an incentive to not only police minor offenses, but potentially
even to create them. For instance, parole officers have the discretion to set
mandatory meetings in the middle of the workday and then report parolees
for violations for nonattendance. Any solutions to the harms of parole that
are detailed in this Article have to involve rethinking all of the institutions
that contribute to the problem.
329. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 50–60 (2009), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/
pdf/139.pdf.
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APPENDIX: New York Stop, Question and Frisk Report Worksheet

